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INTRODUCTION
The problem of evil has been a stumbling block to mankind
through all the ages and philosophers of all times have tried to
solve this problem.

At oertain periods of history questions like:

ItWhenoe is evil?" or:

"11' there is a oreator-God, how oan He

permit so much evil and oruelty in His world1" have especially
moved the hearts of men.

Without doubt our oentury i3 such a time,

a oentury of two world wars.

50

In the 2nd world war alone more than
million men, women and ohildren were killed. l Thousands of

times a day, when their children and beloved ones were torn to
pieces by bombs and grenades, people oursed God - if indeed there
was a God at all.

Wolfgang Borchert expressed the mentality of a

Whole genera.tion, when he wrote in 1946:
"Lieber Gott. Lieber Gott. Aber ich sage nioht Lieber
Gott, du, ioh kenne keinen, der ein li.ber Gott ist,
du •••• Wsnn bist du eigentlich lieb, lieber Gott?
Warst du lieb, ala du meinen Jungen, der gerade ein
Jabr alt war, ala du meinen kleinen Jungen von einer
bruellenden Bombe zerreissan 1iesst? Warst d~ da lieb,
als du ihn ermorden liesst, lieber Gott, ja1"

IGermany Reports, Published by the Press and Information Offic
of the Feaaral dovernment, 1961, p. 32.
2Borohert, Draussen vor der Tuer, Gesamtwerk, p. 181: "Dear
God,Dear God. But I dont~ay-rDear God--you'; I dontt know anyone, who is a Dear God •••• Tell me when you are kind, dear God?
Were you kind, when you permitted my year-old son to be torn in
pieces by a whirling bomb? Were you kind then,when you permitted
him to be killed, dear God?"
1

2

In this situation we Christians have the responsibility to
give an answer to a desparately questioning mankind.

The great

outlines of the answer, which the Church gave through many centuries and still gives today, were systematically elaborated by ':it.
Augustine.
For St. Augustine as for the men of our woeful days, the prob
lem of evil is the deaisive problem of life.
with the solution all his lifetime.

Augustine wrestled

It is the purpose of this

study to point out the basia pr1nciples of his solut1on.

Others

have undertaken sim1lar studies, inaluding Jolivat's excellent
article

~

Problema

~

!!!

d'.pres Saint Augustin. We regard this

study therefore as a reevaluation of St. Augustine's teaching
about the problem of evil.
This thesis will. limit its consideration of the problem of
evil to st. Augustine's anti-Maniehean works (with a few helpful
referenaes to other books).

We must state at onee that we will no

find in his anti-Manichean works the total answer to the problem
of evil which Augustine gave.

One could distingu1sh three stages

in the solution of Augustine to the problem.
First, 1n the writings immediately after his conversion, as

-

_

in De Ordine and De ....................
Musica, evil is primarily seen as priVation of
goodness and the

neoessa~

oonsequence of finite natures.

evil is nihil or the tend&lilcy to nothing.

As such

This physical evil is

justified from the point of vie. of the order of the aosmos.

The

great beauty of the un1verse could not exist without corrupting

3
lower beings.
solution.

This solution we call with Jolivet the esthetio

As tar as it goes, it is oorreot, but it is insufficien

in a world of sin.

Augustine always retains this solution.

He

states it still in one of his lest books, his De Civitate Dei.

-

-

Seoond, reading Holy Soripture,.Augustine became more and mor
aware of the oentral position whioh free will and sin have in the
problem of evil.

Augustine from then on stresses the tact that

sin is the only evil.

In so ts.r as physioal. evil affliots man, It

gets it real meaning from tree will and sin.

ThIs meaning shows

it to be a punishment and medioine for moral evil.

In the anti-

Maniohean books Augustine maintains the esthetic solution, but
this moral solution is the dominant one.
Third, in later years, especially in the fi8ht against the
Pelagians, Augustine had to go deeper into theological implioation
of the problem of evil.

Thus he had to oonsider the relation bet-

ween graoe and free will and the problem of predestination.

Since

this thesis intends to be a philosophical study, we exolude with
all the later books these theological questions from our oonsideration.
Augustine subdivides the basic problem into two questions:
1) What is the nature of evil? 2) What is the origin of evil?
Philosophers of anoient and modern times have arrived at a variety
of different answers to this problem.

The Manicheans saw them-

selves oompelled to aoknowledge an evil Prinoiple that fights
against the good Prlnoiple.

This fight shows itself In a world,

4
where parts of the good Principle are captured by the evil PrinciPE
This evil Principle then is identified with matter.

Edgar S.

Brightman, a philosopher of our time, did not go thus far but the
inexplainable aspect of evil forced him to think of God as limited
in his power by a "Given" in God

him~elf.

Others like Schopen-

hauer and his followers replaced the oreator-God by a blind power.
Again others on the opposite extreme tried simply to deny the reality of all evils, explaining them as a purely subjeotive illusion
These and similar solutions necessarily end in contradiction.
It is true that Augustine cunnot explain the problem of evil without leaving a residue that is not fully explainable for the human
mind.

Instead ot leading to final

co~radiotion,

solution ends in the mystery of the infinite God.

however, his
The Augustinian

solution is satisfactory, sinoe the human mind is willing, or at
least is able to bow before the mystery of the infinite God. It
cannot and must not,however,acoept an apparent oontradiction.
The most basic differenoe between Augustine's solution and
many of the extreme solutions, is that for Augustine the starting
point and the touchstone of vll his philosophizing about the problem of evil is the infiniteness of God.

God is the greatest being,

the highest good; He is Being and Goodness itself.
unshakeable truth for him.

This is an

Anyone who does not agree with AugusthE

on this point will not be able to understand his solution.
From this theooentric way of thinking follow some characteristic traits in Augustine's solution.

These have caused sharp cri-

5
ticism of his 'handling of the problem of evil.

One of these traits

is the overall importance Augustine attributes to the universal
order.

The universal order is for Augustine an image of the unity

in God.

He measures the good or evil of a single being at the de-

gree and place, how and where it fits into this order.

Because of

this, Scipio) accused Augustine of n;t having solved the problem
of evil.

He sa.ys that Augustine completely overlooked. the indivi-

dual being.

It is our concern to show that although Augustine

stressed the higher order, he did not overlook the interest of the
individual human being.
Another consequence of Augustine's theocentric thinking is his
stress of the negative character of evil.

God is being, and since

evil is the opposite of being, it can only be nihil.

Beoause of

his concept of nihil Augustine has been reproached from different
sides.

Trepte4 contends that Augustine at times uses the nibil

as • positive principle, substituting it for the evil principle of
the Manichean8.

Windelband5 goes so far as to say that Augustine

never overcame the Manichean dualism of his earlier days.

3K • Scipio. Des Aurelius Augustinus Meta~hysik im Rahmen
seiner Lehre vom Uba!, (Leipzig 1886), p. !o
-- .
4A.Trepte, Die metaphysische Unvollkommunheit der Creatur und
das moralische Ubel bei Augustinus und IJeibn1z, (Halle 1889),
pp.

3-6.

5W.Windalband, A Histo;:z of Philosophl. trans. J. Tufts,
}th ad. (New York, 1'9'5'), p. 2'8'5.

6
A consequence of Augustine's oonoept of evil as nihil is his
explanation of the aotivity of evil beings in this world.
thing, evil cannot have any effective power.
calls the evil act a Idafect'.

Therefore Aug,lstine

Critics like SciPi06 and Trepte 7

have understood this concept as if Augustine denies any
the evil SUbject, to the

t

As no-

natura cOl."rupta'.

pows~'

to

Against this interpre-

tation we contend that one has to distinguish between the formal
and the ms.terial aspect of evil in order to understand Augllstine
in this point.

The formal aspect of evil expresses the privation,

the absence of the good that is due for the perfection of a being.
As privation then evil cannot be effective.

on the

ot~ler

The material aspect,

hand, shows the corrupted subject, as deprived partly

of its goodness.

In so far as it exists, this ;3ubject has activitYJ

but as a corrupted subject its activity is defective.
This thesis is divided in three main parts.

In the first part

we give a short sarvey of the role which the problem of evil had
in Augustine's life.

In the second part we deal with physicul evilJ

and in the third, with moral evil.
each divided into two sections.

The second and third part are

The first section is concerned

with the nature of ev11, the second w1th the origin of evil.

6saipl0, pp. 107-108
7Trepte, PP. 30-32

In

7
this divi sion we follow Augustine himself when he tells the fl,4'anicheans that one cannot talk about the origin of evil before one
knows what evil 18. 8

CHAPTER I
THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN
ST. AUGUSTINE'S LIFE.
This thesis will be concerned with the problem

or

evil in

-

St. Augustinets antl-Manichean books, especially De Moribus Manl-

-

ohaeorum, Q! Libero Arbitrio, Disputatio contra Fortunatum, Contra
Epistolam Maniahaei quam Voaant Fundamenti, Contra Faustum

!!E±-

ne Natura Bona contra Xanichaaos, and the other minor works
In the Retraotationes, Augustine himself advises his readers

ahaeum,

to rollow the order of time in which he wrote his books, so that
they might notioe the progress he was able to make during his lifetime in the understanding of the mysteries of nature and grace. l
Such a development oan also be found in his treatment of the one
problem that occupied Augustine during his whole life: the problem
of evil.
In the analysis of the rollowing chapters it will be
to neglect the temporal order.

n~cessary

Therefore, it seems advisable to

give first a general surveyor this problem at the different stages
of Augustine'. theoretiaal development.
laetraot., prolo,_ 3; PL. 32,586: "Inveniet enim rortasse
quomodo scrlbendo pro eaerii; quisquis opusoula mea, ordine quo
scripta, legerit."

8

9
Reading his Confessions one finds that the history of Augustine's oonversion was most int1mately oonneoted w1th the solut1on
of the problem of ev1l.

To his friend Evodius Augustine says that

in his early youth already he was vexed by this problem but was
2
unable to find a solution.
When 19 years old August1ne read Cioerots Hortensius.

By this

book he was stirred up from the immoral life into whioh he had
sunk at Carthage. 3 A love for truth, the philosophioal evos 4 was

-

awakened in him. A longing for the spiritual world beoame very
strong in him; but the Hortensius itself, as Augustine says in his
Confessions, could not satisfy this longing.

In vain did Augustine

look for the name of Christ in it:
" ••• Quoniam hoo nomen seoundum misericordiam tuam,
DOmine, hoe nomen salvatoris mei, tilii tui, in ipso
adhuo laote matris tenerum oor meum pie blberat et alte
retinebat,et quidquid sine hoo nomine tuisset quamvis
litteratum et expolitum at veridioum, non me totum rapiebat. tt.!:>

2De Libera Arbitrio, I, 2; PL. 32,1224: "Eam quaestionem moves
quae me-admodum adolesoentem vehementer ex.rouit, et fat1gatum in
haeretioos pulit atque dejeoit. Quo casu ita sum afrliotus, et
tantis obrutus aoervie 1nanium tabularum, ut nisi m1hi amor 1nveniend1 veri opem divinam impe~ravisset, emergere inde atque in ipsam pr1mam quaerendi libertatem respirare non possem.n
3contessiones, III,2; PL. 32, 683: "Rapiebant me speotaoula
theatr1oa, plena imaginibus miseriarum mearum, et fomitibus Ignis
mei."
4 Conf• III,4; PL. 686'1 n ••• hoo tamen solo deleotabatur in
illa exhortations, quod no. lllam aut illam seotam, sed ipsam quaeoumque esset saplentiam ut diligerem, at quaererem et adsaquerar
at ten.rem atque amplexarer fortiter ••• "
SConf. 111,4; PL. 686.

10
30 Augustine turned to Holy scripture, but he could not yet

grasp the high wisdom of the Bible and its style was too simple to
fasoinate him. 6
At this oritioal moment the Manicheans offered to solve all
aia troubles.

They boasted to give scientific solutions to all

problems, and Augustine sought truth by means of pure human knowledge.

All day long the Manioheans had the name of Christ in their

mouth.

This name of Christ was for Augustine a criterion where to

seek the truth.

They had their own method of bib1ioal exegesis

which seemed very promising to Augustine.

Most of all, they

offe~

a final solution of the problem ot evil, which had become more
vexing for him since he had been awakened by the Hortensius to
the search of truth and felt the burden of his sensual life more
than ever betore. 7
As to Holy Soripture, the Manicheans taught there to be a
oontradiction between the Old Testament and the New Testament.
They oontended that many parts of the New Testament were falsified
by the Christians.

Th1s treatment of the Bible appealed very muoh

to August1ne, for at that time he was unable to make sense out of

6conf• III,5; ~. 32,686.
7Conf. VI,4; PL. 32,722: !IVa., vae, quibus gradibus deductus
sum in profunda lnriri? Quippe laborans et aestuans inopla veri,
cum te, Deus meus oum te non secundum intellectum mentls, ••• sed
secundum sensum carnis quaererem. tr

11

most parts of the Old Testament and ot great sections of the New
Testament.

In order to understand the Scriptures he had to hear

from St. Ambrose that the 'letter killeth, but the spirit giveth
life l

8
•

Augustine was especially

attrac~ed

by the fundamental teachine

of the Manicheans about the two independent Principles, the one
good and the other evil.

These existed independently and apart

from one another from. all eternity.

They were to be thought ot as

coming into a conflict which resulted in the produotion of this
world and of man.

The evil Princ1ple more or less ooinoided with

material being, which waa originally ohaos. Although the good
Principle is

~poken

of as spirit, it is not conceived as spiritual

in the full technical sense. It is material in a lighter form,
vapor-like in nature.

The Father of Light is God, and the Prince

of Darkness ia the devil.

But unlike the Christian God, the Father

of Light is .finite and limited.

The Manichean God is limited by

the existence of the independent Principle of Evil.

Where the

kingdom of the one begins, the other necessarily ends.
Augustine himsel.f at this early time had no concept of a pure
spirit or of an absolute substapoe. 9

Therefore it was hard for

him to solve the problem of evil whioh pressed on his mind. As he

8~. VI,Lu f!:.

32, 722.

9 0o n1!. IV,lb, ~.32, 706: "Sed quid mihi proderat, putanti

quod tu, Domine Deus veritas, corpus esses lucidum et immensum, et
ego frustrum~1e ill corpore? II

12
says, his piety could not admit the thought of God having created
any evil nature. 1o No wondar that he could not resist the Ma.nichean propaganda, since it boasted of giving an answer to his precise
difficulties and doubts. ll
During his stay in aathage in the company of' his- friends,
Augustine also was confronted" with an argument against Manicheism
whioh he oould not refute.

It was Nebridius who advanced the dif-

flculty: What would the Principle of Darkness do against the Prinoiple of Light?

It could either injure it or not injure it.

If

it could injure it, then the Prinoiple of Light was no real God.
If the Prinoiple of Darkness could injure the Prinoiple of Light,
then the latter did wrong in entering into confliot with the Principle of Darkness and so imprisoning part of itself in darkness. 12
This argument seemed irrefutable to Augustine.
Beside the diffioulties against the Manichean creed as that
raised by Nebridius, studies in astronomy made Augustine aware of

1000nt. V, 10: PL. 32,715: nEt quia Deum bonum nullam ma.lam
naturam-oriasse quaIrsoumque me piatas oredere oogebat, oonstituebam ex adverso sibi duas moles, utramque infinitam, 3ed malam angustius, benam grandius, at ex hoc initio pestilentioso me cetera
saorilegla s.quebantur. 1I
llIbld., III,7;PL. 32,688: tfNesoiebam enlm allud, vera quod es'
et quasr-iCutele moviDa~t ut suffragarer atultis deoeptoribus, oum
a ma quae~.retu~ una. malum est. Et utrum fo~ma corporea deus
fin1~etur, at habe~et capillos et ungues ••• rt
l2Ibid ., VII,2; ~. 32,734.

13
of the soientific errors in the books of Mani. How then could M.ani,
who olaimed to be the appearance of the Holy Ghost, be right

in

his teaching about other subjectq and about God himself, if he did
not even know earthly sciencesi 13
Augustine passed many painful and distressful years in Carthage, full of inner embarrassment, waiting for Faustus.
cheans said this man would solve all difficulties.

The Mani-

Added to all

his intellectual doubts "ere the actions of the Elects of the

~~ani-

cheans which he witnessed in Oarthage, some of whom behaved just
opposite to their professed abhorrenoe of women; again from Rome
came rumors about various scandals in the community of the Elect.
For over nine years Augustine had waited 'nim1s extento
derio,14 for the coming 01' Faustus.

S!!!-

When Augustine was 28 years

of age, he finally met Faustus and found him nothing more than a
clever and agreeable talker, making no pretense at scienoe or philosophy, and not very well read. He was unable to help solve any
of Augustine t
thi~new

8

doubts and diff1oulties. 15 Faustus could not sayan,

to Augustine and left him in a more desperate position he

had ever been before.

13 conf., V,5; PL. 32,709.

14Ibid., v,6; ~.

32,710.

15 Ibid .: "Ergo ubi venit, expertus sum hominem gratum et jucundum verbis, at aa ipsa quae 111i solent dicere"multo suavius
ga.rrientem ..... IQ1'I1 rebu3 tali bus satiatae ers.nt aures meae; nee
ideo mihi mellora videbantur, quia Melius dicebantur; nee ideo
vera, quia diserta; nee ideo sapiens, quia vultus congruus et decorum el01uium."

14.
Taking into consideration Augustine's accounts of his experiences among the Manicheans, one oannot escape the conviction that
he never wholly was a Manichean, that he neVer surrendered absolute
ly to this system. 16 But atter all these disapointments, especially with Faustus, his already weak Manichean beliefs all but dissolved.

Nevertheless he did not break entirely with the

he decided to go to Rome.

Manichean~

The rashness ot this departure seems to

indicate that he wanted to get rid of all that reminded him of his
intense Manichean activity in Oarthage.

He now sought completely

new surroundings and a free atmosphere in which he could look tor
the truth without an: narrowing presuppositions.

When in spite of

all his doubts Augustine remained wIthin the community of the Manieheans, then the reason for this was that he still was unable to
find another solution for the problem of evil than the doctrine ot
the Manieheans that the evil which happens in us is not originated
by us, but by another nature.

This evil nature in us is part ot

the evil Principle, which is materia.

Because he could not con-

eeive a spiritual being he could not find a solution tor the
17
problem of evil.

16cont• VIII, 7 J PL. 32,757: "Et ieram per via.s pravas superstitione-iicrilega, non quidem certus in ea, sed quasi praeponens
earn ceteris, quae non pie qua.erebam sed In1mice oppugnabam. fI
17IbId., V,lO; PL. ,32,715: tJ Et quoniam eum de Deo meo eogitare
vellem,-cogitare nisr-moles corporum non noveram, neque enim videbatur mihi esse quIdquam quod tale non esse*, eammaxima et prope
sola causa erat inevitabl1is erroris mel. tf

Shortly after his s.rrivbl at Rome he fell into a dangerous
illness that kept him in bed for a long time.

Wnile recovering

from his illne8 Augustine had much time to think,

He no longer

hoped to find in Manioheism the answer to his dlfficulties.

He

oame to the oonolusion that the position of the so oalled Aoademio
was the one whieh would most fit hlm in all his doubts,

He wanted

to safeguard hlmself aga.lnst the danger of falling from the Manichean error into some other error. 18
Yet Augustine was too passionate a seeker of the ultimate
truth for academic scepticism to take a firm hold of him.
turned from Maniohelsm to scepticism, the wish to consult a Christla. expert who was versed in the Scriptures beoame strong in him.
After hearing mueh about the skill of Ambrose of Milan in explaining the Holy Seriptures he aocepted the offer of profelsor in rhetorio In Milan.

From Ambrose he learned how the <:)oriptures, espe-

oial1y the Old Testament, oould be explained in a spiritual way.
Thus he beoame aware of the false interpretation of the Soriptures
by the Manioheans who rejected the Old Testament completely becaus

18 conr., V,lO; PL. 32,715: "Etenim suborta est etiam mihi oogitatlo;-prudentloreS-illos ceteris fuisae philosophos, quos Aoademicas appellant, quod de omnibus dubltandum esse oensuerunt, nee
aliquid Veri ab homine comprehendi posse deereverunt."

-

19 Ibid., V,ll; PL. 32,716.

-
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them it contradicted the New Testament. His deeply rooted
'materialism20 and his newly accepted scepticism hindered Augustine
~or

from a complete conversion to the Catholic Faith.

Nevertheless he

decided to beoome a catechumen until he would reach a

de~lnitive

solution ot his ditficulties. 21
The turning point for a solution of the problem of evil was
his acquaintance with Neoplatonism: uProcurastl mihi per quemdam
hominem ••• quosdam Platonioorum libros ex graece lingua in latinarr
versos. ,,22
In hearing the sermons of Ambrose, Augustine had already beoome familiar with quite a

~ew

elements of the Neoplatonic doctrine

Ambrose himself used Plotinus in his exegetical sermons in such a
way that he often found it unnecessary to change a word of Plotinus
text. 23

Thus the Christianity which Augustine reoeived from Am-

brose was partly in Neoplatonic terms.

On the other hand his later

20Cont., v,14. PL. 32,718: "Tunc vero fortiter intend! animu.m,
si quo modo possem certis sliqulbus documentis Maniohaeos oonvinoere falsitatis. Quod s1 possem spiritualem sUbstantiam oogita»e,
statim maohinamenta ilIa omnia solvetentur et abjloerentur ex animo meoJ sed non poteram."
21~.

22 Ibid., VII,9. PL. 32,740.
Gf. swiiiISki, Neoplatonism and the Ethios of st. AUfustine. After
thorough studies Swlialskl oomes to ine ooncluSIon-- n agreement
with ,P. Henry--that with'Libri Platonloorum' are meant the Enneads
ot Plotinus.

23 0r • Boyer, Ghrlstlanisme at neo-~latonisme dans 1a rormatio~
Auggstin, (Par is ,1920), p:-llO: ••• M. Couralle a-fa1t la

S!~.

preuve que ces memes sermons contiennt dtassez longs passages de
Plotin, a peine retouches pour 1e;3 necessites de l' orthodoxie. ,~, es!
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reading of the Platonists is done in the light of the Christian
·doctrine. 24 It is impossible, however, to speak of Augustine's
conversion to Neo-platonism, as Nolan B. Harmon does it in his article on St. Augustine. 25 Quite the contrary, because he had absorbed already too much of the Christian thoughts, Augustine found
in the books of the Platonists great parts of the Christian teachIng.26

As Barion says, even today the statement of St. Thomas

about Augustlne's relation to P10tlnus must be regarded as true:
"Augustlnus qui doctrine Platonlcorum 1mbutus fuerat, s1 qua lnvenit fidei aocomoda in eorum dictls, assumpsit; quae vero invenit
fidei nostrae adveI'sa, in Melius oommutavlttr (S.Th.,I, qu. 84, a.

5) •

ainsi qu'AmbI'oise, dans son De Isaak (VIII,7o) suit manifestement,
et parfois mot POuD mot, de a8veloppement du traite Sur le Beau
de 1a premiere Enneade •••• C'est assez pour comprendre commenr-les
verltes chretiennes arrivalent aux oreilles dtAugustin avec une resonnanee en pa,rtle neo ... platoniolenne. If

240 1', 1;!;. Gilson, The Christian Philosoph~ of st. Augustine,
trans. L.E. Lynch, (Ne~ork, 196,}, p. lo8~ !he-raet that Augustine never had the slightest doubt about the purity of Plotinus'
notion of creation, leads one at least to assume that, from the
outset, he read the Enneads as a Ohristian."
25Nolan B. Harmop, list. Augustine and the Problem of Bvil li ,
Relifion in Lite, (1944-45), p. 404: "In tact, Augustine throughout
hIs Ire was profoundly influenoed by Plotinus, as he had been for
a time a believer in this system--called neo-Platonism,"
Gf. Bar1on,Plotin und Au~ustinus, untersuChu~en !:!:!:!!LGottesproble~,
(derl1n, 193;), p. li2: tf arln stlmme leh Holzu ... dass der Einfluss des Neuplatonismus auf Augustin nicht als eine Bekehrung bezelehnet werden kann."
26 Of, Boyer, p. 108 •

18
In the seventh book of the Confessions St. Augustine desoribes
the great light and the knowledge he gained from reading the books
of the Platonists.

There he learned that we must turn away from

the contemptible things of this material world and direct ourselves
to the

w~ld

Being.21

of spirit to fiad God

a~

the eternal unchangeable

God becomes for Augustine the highest being, the highest

good and pure spirit.

This concept then of God as pure spirit

enabled him to conceive evil not as a substance, but as non-being.
Evil is the privation of the good which is due to a ns.ure. This
muoh knowledge about the nature of evil was great progress.

still

the unoertainty about the root of evil caused him much inner painit
In thls point, Christian doctrine, prob.bly as preached by St.
Ambrose, was the most h.lpful souroe of an solution to the problem
of evil.

St. Ambrose namely, aiming at the Manicheans, insisted

strongly that the sou.rce of our evil-doing is in our own :Cree will.
Plotinll.8 had helped Augustine to overoome the Nanichean materialism and dualism.

But for Augustine the Christian, Plotinus'

solution was not sufficient.

For Plotinus evil was non-being and

270onf., VII,lO; PL. 32,746: "Sed tunc lectis Platonicorum
illls lIOrIs, posteaqu8m inde admonitus quaerere incorpoream veritatem, invisibilia tua, per ea, quae faeta Bunt, intellecta conapexi ••• "
28 Ibid., VII,7; PL. 32,739= "His itaque salvis atque inconcusae ro'6oratis in animo meo, quaerebam aestuans, unde sit malum.
Quae illa tor~lenta, parturient1s cordis mei, qui gemitu'>, Deus
maus."
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and as such must be seen within the order of the whole univorse,
where it has its determined place, thus contributing to the beau.ty
of the cosmos.

In the beginning Augustine embraces this solution

with all his heart and he neV':9r deperls from this solution.

But

with the progress of years Augustine more end more moves away from
the philosophers, making revelati ,n the great source of all his
knol'lledge and searching.

Correspondingly also the solution he

gives to the problem of evil. gets a more theological aspect.
o~ly

The

real evil tor hIm then Is immoral action, the evil that origi-

nates in the hQman tree will and Is the origin of all other evils.
The problem of evil becomes intimately connected then with the
revealed truths about original sin, inoarnation and redemption,
truths which the philosophers are unable to find.

The tlnal solu-

tion ot the problem of evil then becomes for him the beliet in the
all-surpassing love and goodness ot God.

CHAPTER II

PHYSICAL EVIL
A.

1.

~ ~

The Constituents of Good

summum !!..!!. II summum bonum

Augustinets solution or the problem of evil is strongly determined by the most characteristic and outstanding trait of his
thinking and writing: his theocentric orientation.

All Augustine'

thinking and explaining takes its start from the point of God as
the higheat being and the cause of everything that exists.

This

theoeentric point of view was not lea,rned from Plotinus, but was
implanted into his heart from his mother in his earliest childhood
Even his becoming a Manichean was motivated by the desire to maintain the concept of God immaculate.

He preferred to accept a sub-

stantial evil principle than to be forced to declare God as the
cause of evil.

It 1s true, only the reading of the Neoplatonie

books enabled him to conceive God as the ultimate cause of all
beings.

Yet Neoplatonism did not effect a completely new directio

in Augustinefs thoughts but only gave him the philosophical tools

20

21

to express his most inner longing.l

If, therefore, we want to understand the method and the soluof the problem of evil in St. Augustine, we have to know first
what 'God t means for him.

With regard to the Manicheans Augustine

explicitly that a correct concept of God would have saved
them from their ridiculous thinking about evil. 2
SB.yS

-

God is for Augustine the highest being, ........................
summum esse. 3 Being,
however, does not mean a mere factual existence , bare of all value, but means goodness as such.

All the creatures that exist re-

ceived their being from God and so represent in different degrees
the infinite being of God.

In them Augustine points out how valu-

able being is and how much preferable to non-being.
strive and tight to keep their existence.
those who are unhappy, choose to live.

For all beings

All human beings, even

If they are asked what theJ

prefer, it is existence over non-existence,

~nose

who commit sui-

cide, in realIty do not want non-existence but they look for peace.
And what is peace other than ordered being.

"The whole object of

lLe Roy Burton, The Problem of Evil, A Criticism of the Augustinian Point of Vlew,-rchlcago 19I7);--In thIs book the-aUjhor
reproaches Augustine beoause of this theocentrlc attitude and trie~
to prove that it hindered Augustine in finding e. final solu.tion of
the prOblem ot evil. However, as an extreme evolutionist Le Roy
Burton is unwilling end .nable to accept that only a theocentrical
ph11~sophizing can reach a solution in this problem.

-----

2De
Givitate Dei, XI,22J ........
PL. 41,336
...-..- .
3De Moribus Manichaeorum, 1; !&. 32,1345

2?

wanting to die is not non-existence but

re~t.

So while such a man

erroneously believes that he will no longer exist, his nature longs
to be at rest, that Is, to have fulleI" beli.g ...4
If all created being is

30

valuable that no nature wants to

lo.e It, how much more valuable must be that belng, that Is Being
itselt, the belng that has no contact with non-belng at all.
"Hoc enlm Intellecto atque perfeoto, slmul vide rent Id
esse quod summe ao prlm1tus esse rectls81me dlcitur.
Hoc enim maxime esse dicendum eat, quod semper eodem
modo se •• habet, quod omnimodo sui alml1e est, quod
nulla ex parte cOl"rumpi ac mutari potest, quod non subjaoet tempori, Quod aliter nunc S8 habere quam habebat
ante., non potesta Id enlm est quod ease veriasim.
dioitur. Subest enlm huia verba manentls in se atque
incommunicabl1iter seS8 habentis naturae signlfioatio.
Hanc nihil allud quam Deum pOSSUMUS dicere, cui sl contrarium recte quaeras, nihil omnino est. Esse enim
contrarlum non habet, nisl non esse. Nulla eat ergo
Deo natura contrarla."~
31noe God Is the highest good and is being itself, He is absolutel,
unohangeable.
most

This unchangeableness of God is for Augustine the

cha~acterlstl0

creatures.

mark or God's infinIte superlority above all

Theae are all ohangeable because they are oreated out

ot nothingne s s.
All consideratIons about the changeable creatures lead Augustine to that Being that is the origin of the existenoe ot all and
is being in all its tullness, goodness, immutabIlIty and eternity.
4De Libero Arblttio, III,S, PL. 32, 1282: "Omnia itaque 11le
appetltus In voluniate mortis, non-ut qul moritu» non slt, sed ut
requieaoat Intenditur. Ita cum errore oredat non se tuturum, netUI"B tamen quietus e.ae, hoo est magis 8sse desiderat."
5D8
Moribua Maniohaeorum, 1; -PL. 32, 1345.
............
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If we want to understand the finite things, we have to see them in
their relation to their orlgin and cause, the highest good.

Augustine enumerates three reasons for the ;:;;oodness of a.ll
creatures.

These reasons correspond in a certain way to the three

causes: the efficient cause, the formal cause and tho final cause.
Just as these causes are most intimately connected with one anotheli
so the reasons Augustine gives oannot be perfectly distlnguished
from one another.
The reasons are: 1) all things are good beoause they are orea.ted by God; 2) they are good beoause they partioipate in

bein,.~

with its three attributes of measure, form and order) 3) all things
are good beoause they are parts of the universal order.

These

three reasons we will consider now.
It 1s a fundamental axiom of Augustine's teaching that all
finite substances are oreated by a free aot of Godts will.

This

doctrine is displayed in the explicit distinotion between the creatures whioh received their existenoe through the will of God, from
the eternal Son of' God who prooeded .from the essence of God:
"Ego non solum anicam, {:led et corpus nostrum at omnem
creaturam at spiritualem et corporal em ex Deo esse
dico ••• Sed allud est quod de se Deus genu1t, quod hoc
est quod ipse, ali'-cAd quod fecit Deus. Q,uod Deus genuit,
aequale est Patri.: quod Deus fecit, non e :It aequale oonditum conditorl."O

~De Act1bu3 ~ Felice, 1I,16; ~. 42,516

All finite creatures, although not good in the same way as
God is good, are good because they are caused by God.
cause cannot have a ba.d effect.

For a. good

God, the Summum Bonum, whom noth.iri

can hinder in His activity, cannot produce anything evil.
statement of the goodness of all

nat~res

This

is basic in Augustine's

conceptIon of the world and tor his solution of the problem of
evil.

'Ne find it repeated again and again in the context of this

problem. 7
Yet to explain the different degrees of goodness in Godts
creation, it is not
cause,
iru~er

surficie;~Lt

to regard them from their efficient

For this is the same one for all creatures.

It is the

formal cause that makes these differences in goodness under-

standable.

All things are good, because they participate in being.

and they are not all alike because God gave each of them a different degree of being.8 Those things that received a higher degree
of being are better and nearer to the highest good than those whie!
received a lesser degree.

So there is a broad scale of goodness

7De Natura Boni, 19; PL. 42,557: ~Omnis natura itaque bona
est, etomne bonUiii8.' Deo eSt: omnia ergo natura a Deo est,"
8De GIvltato Dei, XII,2; PL. 41,350: !laum enim Deus assentia
sit, hoc est summe-sIt, at ideo-immutabills sltz rabus quae ex
nihl10 oreavlt, esse dedit, sed non 3U.rome esse, sicut ipse est; at
ellis dedit esse amplius, a1iis minus; atque ita natures essentiarum gradibus ordlnavlt."
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in the world, from the lowest form of dead matter which is near
the abyss ot nothingness, up to the highest torm of created goodness, the spirits, which with their correctly ordinated wills Dnd
intellects partake in the life of God in the Beatific Vision.
If

Ode

asks Augustine about the .characteristic marks of being

that make all things to be good and to be good in all different
degrees, he aBswers that there are three generic goods: 'modus',
'species', and

~rdot.

By contributing these generic goods to things

God gives them their existenoe and plaoes them within the whole of
the universe.

Thus the measure, form and order not only constitube

the conoept but the real and essential criteria of being:
"Ham nemo formara et ere are corpora nisi Deus potest:
neque enim oreanturA nisi cum eis modus et species et
orda subsistit,~ •• "~
Where these generic goods are found, there is an existing creature,
which is a good; where they are not, there 1s nothing at all,10
To some things God gives more of these generic goods and to others
less and thus there arises the endless realm of creatures. ll These

9Q!. Natura~. 18) ~. 42,556.
lOIbid., 23: "Ubi aliquis modus, aliqua speoies, aliquis ordo,

aliquidbOnum aliqua natura est: ubi autem nullus modus, nulla apecies, nullus ordo est, nullum bonum, nulla natura e:1t."

llIbid., 3; PL. 42,553: "Omnia cnim quanta magis moderata,
speciosa, ordlnata sunt, tanto magis uti~e bona sunt: quanto auteD
minus moderata, minus speoiosa, minus ordinata sunt, minus bona
sunt."
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goods are so much the oonstituents of a oreature that a being of
higher degree of measure, form,and order, although it is corrupted,
always rem.ains bettep than another be1ncl of a lower degree.

As

proof for this statement Augustine points to the general estimHtion whioh gold has among men.

Although gold may be somehow cor-

rupted, nevertheless men ase in it a higher value than in uncorrupted silver.

And in the same way, he says, is a corrupted spiritual
being of a higher degree of goodness than any inanimate being. 12

If

~ll

creatures would preserve their special measure, form, and

orde~, there would oe no evil at all. 13

The generio good of measure, form, and order, which constitute
things as good in themselves, have also the connotation of the
relationship to the whole of creation.

To be within the universal

order for Augustine attributes to things a. special value..
not only means a well ppoportioned

re~ationship

Measure

between unity and

multiplicity within the single creatupe, but means also that this
oreatux-e is so proportioned that it fits well into the whole as a
part.

EVan more has order of the single thl11g a relationship to

the opder of the Nhole.

Order generally speaking means

for

Augustine the law of God's wisdom, which oomprehends all and without

wni~h

nothing in God's universe exists or happens.

12:qe Natura .§2!!!"

5; l:!!. 42, 553.

13~., 31; ~. 42, 563.

Outsid~

of
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God's order sin and error cannot exist or cause anything else to
exi8t. 14
B. The Nature and the Origin ot Physical Evil
a. Prelim1na£l questions
Since everything that is, is good, there is only one answer
to the question about the essenae of evil: EvIl i8 'nothing'.
indeed, is Augustinets anllwer.

That

"Deus, qui paucis ad id quod veI'e

est retugientibus, ostendis malum nihil esse."lS
With this answer, however, AUgUstine is tar from saying that
there is no evil In this world.

Augustine sees the life of man

so afflicted with all kinds of evils that many were inolined to
oall Augustine a pessimist ot the worst kind.

His own life had

been too painful with all the doubts and spiritual vexations for
him to oveI'look the pI'esence ot evil in this world.

In the Citz

of God he paints the miseI'ies ot this llte in a compact way.
-are encompassed with ev11s", he says, "and no flood ot eloquence
can suftice to detail the miserIes of this 1Ite."16 Each single
person is surrounded bT dangers and the seed of destruction is in
him trom tne fIrst day of lIte.

He recounts the sicknesses that

14D& Ordlne, I, c. 6; PL. 32,985: "Oausarum autem series 01'dIne Includltur. Et error IPse non solum gignitur causa, sed etlam
glgnit aliquld cujus oausa sit. Quamobrem quo extra ordinem non
est, eo non iotest oI'dini esse contrarius ••• Et bona et'mala in
ordine sunt.
l5501iloq., I, a.l,n. 2; ~. 32,869
l6De 01vltate Del. XIX. 1.1.1 PL. u.l.627 s.
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harm or even destroy beauty and health,l? and before which nobody
1s secure, not even the wise man:
"The amputation or decay of the members of the body
puts an end to its integrity) deformity blIghts its
beauty, weakness its health, lassitude its vigour,
sleepiness or sluggianness its activity and which
of these is it that it may not assail the flesh of
the "lse man?" 16
Even the virtues, though they hold the Ilhighest place among good
things, have as their sale ocoupation to wage perpetual war with
vices, not those that are outside of us, but within. tJ19

So the

very virtues of this lite, Which are the highest goods and "most
useful possessions", bring with them. war and are "all the more
telling proofs of 11te's miseries as they are helpful against the
violence of life's dangers, toils and woes.,,20
Augustine turns to recount the miseries ot sooial life, considering friendships, family, state and the oommunity of m.ankind.
He conclude s a

"Let every one, then, who thinks with pain on all these
great evils, so horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge
that this is misery. And if anyone either endures or
thinks of them without mental pain, this is a more
miaereble plight still, for he thinkLhimselt happy
because he has lost human feeling." Z~

-

-4.

17De Clvi1Jate Del, XXII, 22.
18Ib1d., XIX,
20 Ibid •
21~., XI, 7.

Not are there evils only within man and evils produced by the
co~~mdty

or man, the whole or nature may become an

for the human being.

There

are~xtreme

endless dange

heats and cold, storms,

floods, inundations, lightning, thunder, hail, earthquakes ll •

Ther

are dangers "from the painful or even deadly bites of wild animals
from the madness which a mad dog oommlnioates, so that even the
animal whioh of all others is most gentle and friendly to its own
master, becomes an object of more intense fear than a lion or
dragon". 22

'30

Augustine calls this life here on earth an "intini t

17 deep sea of bitterness".22
The answer then that evil is nihil does not intend to deny in
form of a superficial optimism the real presence of evils in this
world, but it is founded on Augustine's ooncept of God and of
existence as such.

God is the:;upre1ile B&i:J:6 and evil is, as the

Manicheans correotly say, the opposite of God.

Yet the opposite

to the Supreme BaiBi is not a supreme evil substance, but nihil.
An evil substance would be a contradiction in itself.

For sub-

stance means existenee,and all existence is good.
Asked what evil positively is, Augustine's answer is that in
the strictest sense there is only one evil: sin.

But there 1s

another kind of evil connected with the first one: punishment for

-

22De Civltate Dei, XXII, 22.

-
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sin.

However, this is a.lr-eady 'evil t in a broader sense. 23

In an

even wider- sense 'evil' is the so oalled physioal evil, ":lich is
conditioned oy the Itmitation ot' created oeinga.24
This limitation itself, however, Auguatine does not regard as
an evil.

Everything is good in sO

o£ its species.

f~

as it oonta1ns the goodness

That the one species contains less perfeotion

than another species 1s not an evil.

Sometimes 6 Augustine says,

the lower speoies is oalled evil in comparison with a higher speoies,2$

but that is a very improper way of speaking.

A oomplete-

1'1 developed animal is not ugly in itself but only ln comparison
with the humHn being.,a) Thus Augustine rejects an evil as the mere
absenoe of higher goods which do not belong to the essence ot' the
23ctr• FortunatQm, 15; PL. 42,117: "Nam omnia Deus bona fecit,
et bene ordinavl£; peccatum autem non fecit: et hoc est solum quod
dioitur malum, voluntarium nostrum peooatum. Est et aliud genus
mali, quod est poena peccati. CUm ergo duo sint genera malorum,
paceatum at poena peocatiJ peocatum ad Deum non pertinet, poena
pecoatl ad vindicem pertinet."

24ota-. Fallstum Manich.; 22; PL. 42,450: "Ac per hoc in omnibus
qllae humaDa lntlrmitas norret aut timet, sola iniquitas jure damnaturl caetere. sunt vel tributa naturarum, vel merita culparum."
2"De Natura Bonl, 23J PL. 42,5.58: "Item species mala vel in
comparatIone dloi~£ormos!Orls atque pulch~lorist quod ista sit
minor species, illa major, non mole, sed decore. H
26 Ibid., 11U PL.42,555: ft • • • • 8iout in homlnis forma quia major est-putohrltudo, in ejus oomparatione simiae pulohritudo deformitas dleitur:,et lalllt imprudentes, tanquam illud sit bonum,
at hoo malum} nee Intendunt in corpore slmiae Dlodum proprium ••• tt
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speoies.

These limitations are the presuppositions for the exis-

tenoe of minor goods by which the 'beauty of the cosmos is construc
ted.

nEt quia non aequalia omnia fecisti, ideo sunt omnia; quia

singula bona. aunt et slmul om.."lia valda bona.,,2-7
say that the limitation of goodness

is not an evil.

~n

We must therefore

each species for Augustine

It is not an evil to be less good. 28

One could

call it a metaphysical imperfection, because eaoh species realizes
only a limited aspect of intinite being.

But since this lim1tatio

specifies only the positive though limited a3pect otbaing, and
thus is not 'contra naturam' but 'secundum

naturam~

it is not an

evil.

On the other hand, since created being is not the absolute
highest being, this :fa.ct of limitation makes it possible for the
single examplar not to accomplish the whole perfection of what it
should be.

It makes it possible for it to be rObbed of goods it

21cont., VII, 18.
De tG:'tura Boni, 16, !!!_ 42,55Q~ ttQuae taman stiam privationes
rerum sic ordin0ntur 1n universitate naturae, ut sapienter consi.
derant1bus non indecenter vioes suas habeant. Ham et Deus carta
loca et tempora non illumlnando, tenebras teoit tam deoenter quam
dies. 3io._ nos oontlnendo vooant, decenter interponimus In
loquendo s11entium, quanto magis il1e quarundam rerum privationes
decenter facit, sicut rerum omnium pertectus artitex?"

ct.

28contra ~E. Manich.~ o. 31; PL. 42,191: Accusing Manichaeum
Augustine sarsl loquitur 'de Intim1S at pro sui generis modulo in
imc rerum ordlnatis bonis; quae dum comparantur suporiorlbus vItuperandis ab imperit1s exist1mantur, at dum consideratur quantum hi
desit boni, quod 111is adest, ejusdem boni absentia mali nomen
tenet."
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should have.
inoludes a

The specifio metaphysioal essenoe of finite beings

fmo~et

o~

flesa' in its physioal realization.

That

means: An animal is in its essential goodness always better than a
stone.

This eS:3ential goodness remains as long as the subject

exists.

However, if a dog, for example, loses a leg or gets siok

somehow, it does not
it should have.

rep~esent

Therefo~e,

the Whole beauty and. goodness that

the dog is afflicted with physioal evil

It laoks of an aooidental being which is neoess&ry for the full
realization ot its nature,
ness but

privat1~n

Here we find not only absence of good-

of goodness.

The question is: does Augustine think that the necessary oonsequenoes ot the existenoe of limited oorporeal
siokness and
answered

f

suffe~ing

and death, are real

bel!~s,

evi~s?

such as

Many oritios

no', and looking back to whs.t we have seen about the

goodness everything gets by being within the order of the universe,

we would also be tem.pted to give a negative ana_or.

Such an answer

however, would not be correot.
Saying that those evila not due to

t~ee

will

~e

either punis!

ment or 'caused by the limits ot the lowest oreatures in which the
one generation has to Vanish and give plaoe to another l

,29 Augus-

29 ctr• Seound. Manich., 15; PL. 42.596: "Neo tamen omnem defectum
oulpabilem, sed solum. voluntarium, quo anima rational!s
ad ea quae inf~a illam sunt condita oondito~e suo deserto declinat
a.ffectumj hoo est enim quod pe·ooatum vooatur. Caeteri autem defeotus qui non sunt voluntarii, vel poenales aunt, ut peooata puniantur moderatrice summa atque ordinatrice justitia; vel men~uris
rerum in.fimarum interveniunt, ut praeoedentia sucoedentibus oedant.

me
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tinus unambiguously aoknowledges physioal evil as real evil.

It

is true that Augustine stresses at different times that this physical evil cannot be called evil in the strictest sense: "Omnium
igitur corruptionum sola quae vltiosa est corruptia pecte vltuperatur: caeterae, autem, aut ne oorruptiones quidem dioandae sunt,
aut carte quia vitiosae non sunt, dlgnae vituperatione esse non
pO.:3sunt. "30
Wh.sn Augustine pronounoes that "there are only two kinds of
ev1ls, sin and penalty of sinff,31

this must be L1nderstood as cor-

responding to what mostly aosorbes his interest: God, and man in
his relation to God.

"\Vhat do you want to know?" he asks himself,

and his a.nSW$r 1'51 ftGod and the soul I wa.nt to knoW'. --Nothing else
No, nothing $188."3 2

Therefore such a statement as above must not

31J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des Hailigan A!f$ustinus, (Freiburg
i.:8r., 1929), vol.
!53."'1fire Mausoac'fi repraaohes Augustine
for limiting with this statement the problem of evil on an insuffioient basis: "Daa Dilemma, von dem er auszugehen scheint, jedes
fibel mUsse entweder Schuld oder ·"3trafe sein, 1st unvollstandi,_" und
als Grundlage einer vollstindigen Theodizee nicht zu verwerten."
But on the other hand Mausbach is forced to oonoede that Augustine
himself apparently does not under~tand this division of evil l~to
sin and punishment 1n an exclusive way: "D1.se Einte1lling der -3bel
(i.n\;3unde undo Strate) ersoheint nicht vol1standig; sie 1f1rd aueh
von Augustinus nicht iiberall als ausschliessliche gefasst ••• " (Ioi
vol. I, P. 111·112)

tr;-p.

325011109.' I, 2; PL. 32,072.
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be understood • sensu exclusivo' and it does not deny the reality
of physical evils which are conditioned by the metaphysical impertection of created beings.

-

--

b. The essence of evil

Atter having seen that Augustine acknowledges physical evil
as real evil, although only in a broader sense, let us now oonsider what Augustine points out as charaoteristic of evil in its
essence and its origin.
Augustine assigns corruption as the most outstanding oharaoter ot evil.
"Quls eo1m dubitet totum illud quod dicitur Malum,
nihil esse allud quam oorruptionsm? Possunt quide. aliis atque alils vooabulis alia atque alla
mala noainari: sed quod omnium rerum malum sit, in
qui bus mali aliquid animadVert! potest, oorruptio
est. "33
Oorruption, however, can only exist in something good.

Thus the

very corruption itselt proves that the subject, which is corrupted,
is good.
Slnoe goodness means partioipation in being, in existence,
evil as oorruption, as privation ot goodness, is In the same way
privation ot beIng.

Evil is defection trom being, a tendency

toward nothingnessc "malum tendit ad o1hl1um. u With the growing

ot evil, being is diminished.

33Ctr.

!2.

Manich., c.

35;

Should goodness become totally cor~.

42, 201.

35
rupted, the existing nature would vanish.

Finally 1t the nature

disappears completely, corruption also disappears, because corruption can only be in a good nature. 34
As .e have seen earlier, the goodness ot a subject is constituted by the generic goods ot measure, torm and order.
can exist only by participating in these generic goods.

All beings
Evil,

theretore, is a corruption ot these modes ot being: "Malum nihil
alud est quam corrupt10 vel privatio modi vel speciel vel ordinis
naturalis. n35 Evil deprives the thing ot its measure, torm and
beauty, and its order.

But it cannot be a complete deprivation

.1thout aestroy1ng completely the subject and with it the evil
itselt.
Theretore, it is quite apparent that there cannot be an evil
substance.

~o

make this absolutely clear, is the ma1n purpose

Augustine pursues in his considerations about phys1cal evils.
scorpion, tor instance, is not an evil substance,
ana say.

as'~

A

the Maniehe-

For the scorpion is beautiful in its kind, full of order

mea.ure and form.

Even less, ean there be a sO called highest

evil substance, as the Manioneana conoeive it.

"Evil is that Whic}

l4Ctr • !2. Manich., d. 16, ~. 42. 205: "••• quanto magis
augetur corruptl0. tanto matts tendit ut non sit."
35Q! Natura!2!!!, c. 4; .f!;.. 42, 553.

)6
talls away trom eSlence and tends to non-exlstenoe.,,36

Thus the

highest evil would be non-existence, that lSI nothIng.

Evil is

alway8 against the natUl'e of a subject ot which it is an evil:
"Quod aut.m malum,. non· natura, sed contra naturam est. n)1
Conside1'iDg generally what can exist and what really exists,
Augustine classifies all beings in three kinds of gOodsl tbona
vitiata' o1"viti08.', goods which are corrupted by an evil; 'bona
incorrupta', goods whioh a1'8 !"re. trom any evil and thel'etoIte aIta

ot a higher Itank among goods, finally there is a 'bonum incorruptibile', whieh .annot be affected by an evi1. 38 This absolutely
good nature, which 1s God, Iteally exists, but there cannot be an
absolute evil natupe.
Now,

to evaluate ooItItectly the descl"lptions . and definition,

Augustine gives ot evil as cOl'l'uptl0, dereotus, pr1vat10, amiasio
i

.e have to ke.p 1n mind that they are born in the polemic
-boni,
situation against the Vanicheans. Against them he has to avoid
any indication that he regards evil as a palpable reality; tor the
Man1chaana would have understood
reality.
views

m01'8

Dr

such a concept a substantial

Thereforo, in his tight against ManieheisM, Augustine
or 18ss only the formal aspect ot evil.

)6D8 M01'lb. Manioh., c. 2; PL. 32, 1346z "Idipsum .I-IOtO malum
est •••• ~.t!c.l'. a6 .ssent!a et &aId tendere ut non git.~

37Q!!:.. !2. Manich•• c. 33; ~. 42, 199; cf • .!E.!5!., c .. 35.
38~ Clvltate R!!. XII, 3. ~. 41, 351.

37

Th1s formal aspect shows evil 1n its metaphysical essence and
as such evil 1s mere privation of goodness, want1ng in substance,
truth and,beauty_

The material aspect on the contrary shows the

concrete object in its totality, as a SUbstantial being with all
its acoidental determinations.

Viewing this aspect of evil Augus-

tine wauld have had to describe the concrete Object in so far as
it is affected with evil. 39
Now, generally considering the formal aspect ot eVil, Augustine avoids having to speak about evil things or men.
tine does not den7 the material aspect.

ae

But Augus-

is not afraid to call

a C01"'rupted nature bad, although, when sa7ing so, he never omits
to stress that in so far as there is a natu!'e, it is a good:
"ala itaque natura dicitur, quae corl'Upta est: nam incorrupta utique bona est. Sed etiam corrupta, inquantum .najura 8st, bona eat; inquantum corrupta est, mala
est." 40
Not only the corruption in an apple is bad (evil), but the corrup-

39 ct• Nll'sohl, ~l'spru~ ~ Wesen !!! BOlen nach del' Lehre
des Hl. Augustinua, tR.gen~urg, 18>4), p.71. IlrachI iiIl aesor
lEIs~istilnollon between the formal and material aspect • calling
them 1m. subjeotlve and objective poInt of vie.. ae writea2 "1m
e:raten Falle (1.e. 1n the subjeotive polnt,ot view) betrachtet man
das boa. SUbj.kt 1n seiner verkehPten Gesinnung und !itlgkelt, und
du-UJIl wiN man e shier m.1 t del' SUnde, ihl'en verschiedenen Arten
una Graden au tun bahen. Im zweiten Falle wird vom bosen 3ubjekte
ginzlich abatrflhiert. und das B6se in selnem objektiven Sein zu
begrelten una 1n •• 1nam Verhiltlusse zum Subjekte zu bestlmmen geaucht. Diese Betrachtungsweise glbt uns den abstrakten Begriff
des BOsen, des Bosen als selchen, .(hrend jene den konkreten zu
erm1tteln hat."

4°De

Natura~. c.

4;

~. 42, 553.
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ted apple itself i8 bad and as such it can infeot all other apples
wh.lch lie in contact with it.

Augustine never denied thi s very

ooncrete reality, which evil has in this world, and its power to
infect and to spread out.

In his fIght with the Manlcheans, how-

ever, he purposely restricted his consideration to the formal
aspect of evIl.
In the

~~~loso2hie

des

Christentum~,

Staudenmaier points out

that all the Fathers of the Church, agreeing with Augustine in
defending the negative oharaeter ot evil, at the same time neVEH't
deny the objective reality and positive power of evil in this
.0rld.41
It is to be noted that in his later years, especially in his
fight against the Pelagians, Augustine had to switch over to the
more 'natural' use of the word M8lum. 42

This is to say that the

Pelagians forced him to speak about the corrupted nature itself,
not only about the eorpuptlon withIn the good nature.
4lstaudenmaier, Die Philosophi. des Chrlstentwas, P. 553:
.enn auch alle rn:cnenvlte~'" darTiliiDeroeinstimmen, dass das
B~se nioht ein wahrhatt Reales, ein Seln 1n wirkllcher Wahrheit
seIJ denn wahrhaft 1st nur, was aua Gott 1st, und das 1st das Gute,
so haben sle dessen ungeachtet nle die objektlve Wlrkliohkeit des
Sasen, sowie des streben desselben als ein dem Guten pos1tiv entgegengesetstes geleugnet."
IIDenn

42Mausbach. vol. I. p. 110.
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c,

!h! Qrigin £! Physical !!!!
Now that we have seen what Augustine understands by

eVil, namely a privatio

~

ph~sical

debiti, we have to find out where he

indicates the origin of evil is.

Since the negative ohars.cter of

evil shows it as disagreement with nature and having no:

substance

of its own, Augustine puts to himself the quastion:IfWhence then
is

it?t~

To find the answer to this question, he says, we have to

look for the end. to Which all evil leads.
tence, is nothingness.
their being,

This end is non-exis-

In corruption entitles tall away trom

This means that they are brought to noncontinuanoe,

which is the same as non-existence.

While the growing in goodness

and gaining in bein3 oan only come from God, because it is an
approaching to God, evil and corruption can only come from nothingness,because it i9 a ten10noy toward nothingness:
nEt cum ista titi proposuerls esse at non-essG, atque
cognoverls quante magis augetur speoies, tanto quid~le tendere ut sit; quanto magis augetur corruptio,
tanto magis tender. ut non sit: quid dubitas dicere
in unaquaque natura corruptibili quid in es sit ex
Deo, quid sit ex nihiloJ cum specie. ~ecundum nat~a.'n sit, corruptio contra naturam. "L~J
Augustine'. greatest concern in dealing with the problem of
evil is to prove that God is not the oause of evil.

Considering

evil under the formal aspect, namely as absence of being and goodness, it is not too diffioult for him to acoomplish this task. For

what has no existence,

~lat

is nothing, needs no cause at Dll.

Therefore God can not be the cause of evil, of the absence of goodness.
Howeve!.~,

if we conside::." evil under the material a.spect, than

we must say that the evil corrupted nature has been made by God.

Yet it is not what is covr.upted in this creature that 1s f:t'om God,
but only the nature; in so tar as it is good.

Augustine even says

that the natures as tar as', they art) corruptible, are not from God.

"Non faceret Deus naturaa corruptibl1es. In quantum anim natu.t-ae
aunt, Deus fecit; 1n quantum autem corruptlbl1es, non Deus fecit;
non enim est ab 1110 corruptl0, qui salus est incorruptibllis. II 44As the context proves, this oorruetlbll1s must not be understood 1n the strict sense as the poss1bll1tyfor corruption.

For

the posslb111tl tor corruption is at the same time the possibilIty
for improvement and as such it cannot be called evil.

Even matter,

Augustine says, 1s good, for if the actual being 1s good. then

also the eapabl11ty to the good,whloh represents the unformed but
formable matter, is not an ev1l. 45

It theretore the statement

l.!:.- ,42, 20).
45De Nat\l.J.1'8; Bonl, c. 18. ~., 42, 556 s: ltPorro s1 bonum all ...

44ctr_ i2_ Manich. te.

38;

quod es~torma. unde qu1 es. praevalent. tormos! appellantur, siout
a specie specios!, procul dubio bonum aliquod est etiam capaoitss
formae. S1cut quia bonum est sapientia, namo dubltat quod bonum
5i t capacem esse sapientlae,Et:qUia OIl'Jle bonum a Deo, neminem
oportet dub1tare, et1am istam, 81 qua est, mater1am non esse ni3i
a Deo."

that corruptible natures, in so tar as they are corruptible, are
not made by God, is to have any sense at all, Augustine must understand by 'corruptible natures' actually corrupted natures or even
more probably the actual limitation ot natures, which always includes actual absence or goodness~46 .
In this regard the question arises whether Augustine makes the
'nihil' into a substantial principle.

One cannot deny that it is

very misleading When Augustine says that the corruption is not 'ex
Deo sed ex nlhilo' or that as the species and the 'tendere ad esse'
is trom God so the corruption or the 'tendere ad nihilum t is
nihilo.

~

Among other, Trepte, tor Instance concludes trom such

statements that St. Augustine is not consistent in his oonception

ot nothingness.

It is true, Trepte says, that Augustine at ditte ...

rent times very clearly detines • nihil' as the absolute nothingnesa
So tor instance In Contra Jullanum,I,

8:

"Non quIa nIhil habet sliquam vim; si enim habet, non
nihil. sed &liquid esset. Nthil nec corpus est ullus
nee spiritus nee substantiis aliquid accIdens nec intormi. aliqua materia nec inanis locus nec ipsae tenebrae, sed prorsus nIhil. Nihilo naturam faotoris a natupa eorum, quae tacta sunt. disce~nimus."
In this sense howover, Trepte says, the metaphysical impertection
cannot explain the corruptibility ot the creatures.

Metaphysical

46 It appears to miL that in this and similar expressions Augustine comes very near to Leibn1z t metapbfsioal evil. looking upon
all lImitation as impossibly coming trom God--because it is thought
to be evil.

Impe~tectlon

become. somethIng poaltlve, the otherwise po.erlesa

nihil Is ooncelved as havIng a certaln po.ex-.

For otherwise the

nihil cou.ld not b. the basis for a chanae ot the tONS and essences
a8 they come out ot the hands of the Cre.tor. 47
Trapte thinks Augustine had oome to this concept of a powex-tul
nihIl because at his the0rJ of oreation.
God and therefore is InfInite,

80

As ChI-iat 18 born out of

the oreature., because the1 are

born out of nothing. ax-e Impex-tect.

Trepte thinks that thl. com-

parison prov.s his interpPetation of Augustine's concept ot nihil
a. a poaltlve princIple. He aa18 alsol "The natural impex-fectlon
baa to be ...n as the Inhex-ited nothing, out at wblch the oreature
has been formed, and it the nothlna ha. a oertain qualltJ, then
alao the imperfeotion can have a certaIn power and make pos81ble a
ohanae In the oreature. ,,48
Althoush there -7 be some misleading statem.nts in Ausustlne"
_x-ltinga. the,. do not juatlf7 auch an lnterpx-etatlon ot the role at
the g1h11 In Ausustlne's explanation ot the origin or e,,11.

The

vel""f taot tbat Augustine in all hls wrltinas after his convex-slon
abow. such. cle.x- ooncept ot tbe pupel,. negative charaoter of
nothIngness, should make one doubtful that

~ch

an aoute thinker

47T~ept.f p. S. "Neln, dIe .etaphyalsche Unvollkommenhalt kenn
In aex- PON, .la al. oben AugustIn setas':Jt ha.ben wl11, nicht di.
Verderbbax-kelt der Ire.tar erklaren. Sle ist vielmehr bier Augustlr.
unter dar Hand au at... Posltivem geworden, das 80nst ohumaohtise
Nlchts bat elne g.wl.8. I»att erbalten, denn obne elne 801che
konnte e. eina Verand.rung dar von Gott se.etzten Seinawelse der
Kreatur nlcht el"lDogllohen.·'

-

4.8Ibld.,p.5
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~ould

have used the nihil as a powerful principle tor the real con-

struction ot this wor14. 49
One ot the reasons why Augustine so much stresses the creation
out ot nothing is that he wants to distinguish himself tram those
philsophers and haeretics who do not keep a clear distinction between

~he

procession ot the Son out ot the essenpe of the Father,

and the creation'of the world.
11

-

-

In De Natura Boni Augustine explici

J.getuses such haeJ.ges'1 50 and stJ.98SSeS the tact that he does not

think ot a positiVe power when speaking about the nihil.

He J.9idi-

cules those hael'etics, who undeJ.9stand the word ot Holy Sripture:
"S1ne 1110 factum est nih1l", as 11' it said that the nihil was
oreated and there1'ore must be something. 'These people, Augustine
says, lost their minds because of their inclination to contJ.9adict.
He points to some statements of Holl Scripture where it is clearll
express.d that l'dhil does not mean 'something', as in st. Paul t s
letter to the Romans

(14,

l7) a "Qui vcoat ea, quae non aunt, tan-

quam sint. ,.51

49 With J.gegard to the role the nihil has in Augustine's conception ot cl"eation and. the rinite wortd: of. Mausbach, I, p. 137.
50De Batura' Boni, c. 27; PL. 42, 560: "Ex ipso autem non hoc
signif1eat quod de-rpso., Q~odenim d$ ipso est, poteat dioi ex
ipso} non aut•• omlle quod ex ipso est. 11'ect. dicitur de ipso. Ex
ipso eni. ooelum et terra, quIa ipse tecit eaJ non autem de ipso,
quia non de substantia sua. u
51De Natura~, e. 25-26. lk- 42, 559sa.

Having this historical position in mind, whioh was conditioned
by haeretioal adversaries, it becomes absolutely certain that
Augustine did not conoeive of the nihil as a second principle for
the explanation ot a finite oreation and its oorruptibility.
To explain the corruptibility

an~

all change within natures,

it was suffioient for Augustine to conceive God as the highest
Being, the ult1ma substant1a, and ultima
,. causa.
....
~...;..;..;,

him the 'I

am',

This God was foI'

the onlr being that did not receive and possess

his aot of existence, but who is ident1cal with his exi'stenoe and
thel'e.fol"e oannot lose it nor change it.

All other beings reoeived

their act of existence .from God, and as they get it, so they can
lose it.

There oan be a change in them because they came Into

e.xlstenee within time, and thus they are temporal, ohangeable
beings.
But the ohange from being to non-being, rrom the goad to the
bad does not need a cause.

Only the movement toward God, toward

greater being and grsater goodness needs an efricient oause.
is Augustine's conoept ot evil as tabsentia

~ _d~e_b_l~t_it

It

that pre-

vents him tl'om conceiving nothingness as a positive power.52

520t. B1llie.leh, Das Problem des Ubels in del" PhilosoEhie des
Abendlandes, (Wlen, 195$1; 7, p. ZSS;-note !4~ ~ere BI!lIosleh --quotes dIfferent modern c~ltlos 11ke Harnaok, Dorner, Helmsoeth,
Ueberweg-G.yel',eto., who all tI'led to pI'ove that Augustine understands the nihil as a poweI'tul prinoiple, whioh God has to use tor
the oreation of a finite world, so ths.t Augustine had never overcom
the Manich••n dualism. fbis objectlon,how.ver, Augustine had rejeoted already in his book _O_o_n_t_r_~ ~ullanwm.

45
w.

will hlllve to oome baok to the que3tion about the role of

nothingness in Augustine's explanation of evil when talking about
moral evil and its 'deficient cause l

•

For Augustine the ol'igin of physical eV,11
ness ot finite beings.

li~s

1n the oreated ..

The;re is no real caus,. fol' physical evilJ

neither is God the cause of it nol' is the nihil a powertul print

,

ciple that would destroy tinite beings from within.
received their being, they oan lose it.

/

Because they

And they lose it, because

God wanted a world ot continuous ohange, in whioh one generation

ot living beings after another has to vanish to be replaoed by a
still new .one.
It follows, therefore, 1matfor Augustine physical evil would
have been a reality also in a world without sin.
sarily to a finite oreat10n.

It belongs neces-

If God wanted a temporal world of

inanimate and animate bodily beings, He neoessarl1y had to admit
the ooming 1nto being and dylng;ot these things, the fact that
later beings

w~ld

replace the older ones and even tight against

them, the gradual and partly painful decay ot subhuman 11fe. 53

53Bu.rton f s contention that Augustine oompletel., identified
sin and evil and thereto~. was not able to aoknowledge the "necessity of evil wherever 1s 11te", is absolutely unfounded. As in
the quotation &0111 Contra, Secundlnum, XV: tf Caeterl autem defectus
•••• mensurls r.~ Inflmaram Interven1unt, ut praeoedent1a suocedent1bus c.dant •••• ", 1t 1s apparent that tor A~stlne a finite
corporeal world .8088sar117 ineludes 'deteotus· (l.e. evils); only
he Is not willing to accept this sort 01 'evIt· 1n the same sense
as the evil of sin,. Augustine would not 4eny that 1n human life
ignoraace and all sorts of difficulties could be natural and would
have been present in a pure natural order. But for him these diffioulties of lite would not have been really evils, tor they would

46
Refusing to admit any kind of re$i,l causality, especially- in
God, for phys1cal evil as a falling away from being, Augustine
however speaks of some kind of permission of God for the presence
of evil.

Nothing can happen in God's creation without His permit-

ting it.

In Q!. Ordine Augustine has Monica express the comprehen-

sive words about evil in this world.

These have to be applied to

physical evil as well as to punishment and even to moroal evill
" ••• non puto nihil potuiase pra.eter Dei ordinem fieri,
quia ipsum malum quod natum est, nullo modo Dei ordine natum est} sed illa justitia Id inordinatum esse
non slvlt'5~t in stb! merltum ordlnem redegit et
compullt. 4
God permitted this kind of evIl in the cosmos because He saw that
the corruptible beings are in such a way that they only contribute
to the order and the goodness of the universe, and that their
passing away would not leave any- stain on the created beauty.55

have g1ven man the task to overcome them and 30 would have been
the peason for the beauty of heroio struggle in mankind. "Ignorantia vero at dlfflcultas s1 naturalis est, inde inde inoipit
an1mam profioere, et ad oogn1tionem et requiem, donee in ea perflceretur vita beata, promover1." Cf. La Roy Burton, p. 186.

-

54D8
55De

-

Ordine, II, c. 7; PL. 32, 1005.

Natura Bon1, o. 8, PL. 42, 554: "•.•• nee esse, quamv1s
minora et mInIma bona .. nIsi asummo bono Deo potuerunt, !cdc ordlna ..
tasunt, ut oedant Infirmiora tirm.iorlbus, at Invs11diora fortior!"
bus, et Impotentiora potentiorImls, •••• Flt autem decedentibus at
suecodentibus rebus temporalis qusedam 1n· suo genere pulchritudo,
ut nee ipaa quae MG't"luntul", vel quod erant esse desinunt, turpent
aut turbent modum at speciem et ordlnem universae creaturae: s10ut
se~o bene aompositus utlque pulcher est, quamv1s in eo syllabae
atque omnes soni tanq~ nasoendo at moriendo transaurrant."

47
Looking back at what we have achieved up to here, we must say
that these philosophical considera.tlons fln Augustine offer a mere
aesthetical solution of the problem of evil.

or

being and good; it has a purely nega-

si~gle

creature-bears the germ for its decay

essence evil is privation
tive character.

Eaoh

In its metaphysical

in itseli rrom its very beginning.

But by decaying, by taIling

away tZ'om being, the single creature doe.s not p,ollute or at'fect
the beauty and goodness of the universe.

On the contrary, it con-

tZ'ibutes to the goodness of the whole, by fitting in the order as
God's wisdom has designed it.
Yet this 1s not the whole solution Augustine offers with Z'egard to physical evil in the anti-Manichean books.

All physical

evil that somaha",art.cts man Is at the same time consideZ'ed as
punishment. On the following pages we have to try to understand
Augustine's teaching on this point and its Z'elation to what we
called the aesthetical solution.

In his Dialogues, written in the first years after his conveZ'sion, Augustine follows very much the pagan Neoplatonic thought
of Plotinus and so aZ'rives like this one more or less only at the
aestheticsl solution.

Very soon and with the progress of yeaZ's,

howev:;r, he sees this world as one whose orig;inal order has been
destroyed by the sin ot Adam.
Viewing evil from this stsndpoint, Augustine not only differs
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trom Plotlnus but is completely opposed to him.

For in Plotinus

there is no place tor a really free will in a creature.

Lastly

all origin of evil tor Plotinu8 lies in matter, in what has withdrawn furthest from the tOne'. Sinee a oertain neeessity lies over
the whole creation, the original order is never abolishfJd.
the new aspect, however, the original order, whioh

w~s

Under

a superna-

tural one, has been broken down and a new one had to be bu:ll t by
the grace at God.

So physical evil is not only the neoessary con-

sequenoe ot the finiteness at creatures, but is intimately connacted with the sin of AdaD4

The disorder and plagues in this world,

sicknessesand death. are then oonsidered as a privation ot a good,
with which man once was gratuitously gifted or which even belonged

--

to his nature: "vulneratus in natuzaalibus".
--~------

~--------~

As was stated above, even in a creation of a purely natural
order there would have been physical evils.
bave been subjeoted to pains and sutferings.

Then man would also
But these pains and

sutferings would not have been an evil in the proper sense. Now,
however, pains and sufferings are penalties for the sin of Adam
and our own sin.

In this sense Augustine contends that the evils

are not natm.-al: "Eece autem omnia. qua.e teci.iti DellS, bona valdez
mala vero non esse naturalia. 1t
In the order in which man
wi th

~

!acto has been created, namely

supernatural grace and wi-t;h the vocation for eternal life,

man was the lord of this world and all creatures obeyed his command.

Through sin this hierarchy has been corrupted.

The lower
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natures no longer are obedient to the higher natures; the body and
the flesh disobey the commands of the spirit.
longer respects man as its lord.

The animal world no

This whole disorder is the effect

of original sin Which makes all physioal evils, that affliot man
a punishment. 56
Thus all the suffering of the innooent

ereat~es

gets its rea]

meaning only, if it is seen within the order in whioh sin has such
an important plaoe.

In the Q! Libero Arbittl0, for example, Augus-

tine points out how God uses 'the Buftering of the ohildren to correct their parents.

The suffering of the ohildren is without

doubt an evil for the ohildren themselves as tor their parents.
But God uses these physical evils to free the parents from the
slave:ry ot sin a.nd save them tor eternal life.

56 ctr• ~.

For the ohildren

Manioh., 37J PL. 42, 203: nEt hinc maxima apparet
dignltatem, quod Deus qui salus tlbl naturallter domlnatur, fecit alla bona qulbus tu ~oque dominaveris.
Wec m1r.~is quod nunc tIb! non omn! modo serviunt et te ali quando
etiam. cruciant: quia Dominus tuus majorem potestatem habet in aa
quae tibi aerviunt quam tu in ipsa. tanquam in servos lervo:ru.m
IUOrum. Quid ergo miram si tib1 peccanti !d est non obtemperantl
Domino tuo, poenalia qu1bus dominaber1B, effecta Bunt? Hoe namque
humane. natura 1n Adam meruit, de quo nuno non est dlsputandl locus:
sed tamen dominator justus et justls praem11s et justis supp11cils
approbatur, beatltate recte v1ventlum poenaque peocantlum. n
quantttm~l~ribuerlt
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these evils soon will be as if they never had been, while for the
parents they have eternal etfects,S7
Physical evil as punishment has two meanings: it is medicine
tor the sinner himself and it is a means used by God to maintain
the order of the universe, as it is

!! tacto.

Some oritics, as among others K. Seipio, reproach Augustine
of not having solved the

p~Gblem

of evil because, as 18 said, he

overlooked what the suffering under physioal evils means for the
suffering human be1ng,

It 1s not enough, Scipio says58 to tell the

J.urtering human being that hi3 pains and sorrows belong necessari-

ly to the beauty of the universe.

57B!

But this criticism is not justi-

Libero Arbitrio, III, o. 23;

l&.

32, 1304.

58K• Scipio, p. 106: "Das Ubel erweist Augustin als kosmischen
Sohein, hervorgebraoht <lurch den beschrinkten endliohen Standpunkt
des Besohauers. Er vergisst, dass tar das leidende Ioh das Ubel
mebr ist als eine _sthetische !rUbung, well das lch mehr ist als
ein seelenlosea Atom. Er ubersieht, daas del' Kosmos selbst ubal
ist, welcher dem Leldenden kelnen andero Trost zu geban vermag als
den: 'Ou le!dest eigentlioh gar nicht, dein Le!d ist,nur ein Mangel des NOl"Dlalzustandes .. t Geztade bier betindet sioh di. bedenk ...
lichste stelle in Augustins System: tiber die Tier. des Leids und
des'fioels, wie sehr er auch personlich otfenes Gemfit da~r hat.
geht e~ In dar Erklirung zu obertliohlioh hinweg. Der ernstlioh
leidenden P.ra~nllchkelt kann es uberall vollstandig einerle! sein,
dass Ihr Leid antlthetiach der Gesamtsohonhelt der Welt zur Folie
diene. Augustins Beaeitigung des Ubels 1st ein Tasohensplelerstueokohen, .in. Escamotage. NIoht mit isthetlschen (univeraellen)
sondern mit zteliglosem (1ndivlduellen) OptimisMUa hitte er allein
den Pesslm.1am.us f1berwinden konnan. rt
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fied.

While Augustine does say that the most important factor is

that the order of the universe is maintained, or,if it is disturbed
that it is repaired by the suffering of those who are the cause of
the disturbance, he also maintains that it is better for sinners
themselves to sutfer punishment for their sins, so that they might
be healed

~om

the corruption, Which sia has etfected in them.

Explicitly Augustine says that all punishment, whioh we reoeive on
earth, 1s medicine to cure man: "Quldquid dlvlnltus ante i11ud u1tlmum. ludlclum vindleatur, ad medlcinamvalere credendum est."59
In this sense even for the single person punishment is not an evil
strictly speaking because. as Augustine says, sin without punishment Is worse than the suftering of punishment.

For sin is the

real evil and punishment is only the means to cure man trom the
evil ot 91n. 60
Besides being medicine, punishment is u>$ed by God to maintain
the order of the universe, whlch has been destroyed by sin.

God

has a fixed plan of the world, 1n which everything has its p1aoe.
If now man refuses to aecomodate himself to this plan then puniSh-

59~. !2- Manloh •• c. 1,~. 42, 113.
60De NatUl'a Bon1, c. 20; PL. 42, 557: "Sunt autem mala slne

dolor. pejora, pelus est enim gaudere de 1niqu1tate, quam dolere
de corruptiona: verumtamen etlam tale g.udlum non poteat esse nisi
ex adaptione bonorum interiorum, sed in1quitas est desertl0 meliorum. Item in corpore .elius est vulnus oum dolore, quam putredo
sine dolora, quae special1ter oorruptl0 d1oitur.!t
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ment has to replaoe what by his own the sinner does nat fulfill:
t'slout anim qui non vigilat_ dormitJ sio quisquis non
tacit, quod debet, sine intorvallo patitur quod debet, quoniam tanta est beatitudo justitia~1 ut nama
ab oa nisi ad miseriam possit abscedere."b~
God's planning and acting is alw8Y8 directed toward the universal good, whioh 1s at the same time the good ot the individual.
It depends on the tree creature it it aocomodates itself to God's
intentions.

In case the oreature leaves the order and puts itself

in opposition to the divine will, this very divine will and acting,
whioh remains intending the good and happiness for the creature,
must appear in the torm of revenging justioe.

The divine order,

against which the creature fights, turns itself against the sinner.
"Quibus bonis omnibus qui male utI voluerit, divino judioio poenas
luet.,,62
From what haa been said it beoomes clear that Augustine regards punishment as something good.

It is good, because it is a

means tor God to maintain the beauty and goodness of the universe,
which is an image ot God.

It is good beoause it proceeds from

divine justioe, and everything that is just is also good:
nIta ergo Deus malum (poenae) tacit, quod non ipsi

_.

-

61D& libero Arbitrio, III, 15; PL. 32, 1293.
62Q!. Natura!2!!!, c. 13 J ~.

42, 555.
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Deo malum est, sed eis, in quod vlndicat. Itaque
ipse, quantum ad sa pertinet, bonum facit, quia o~e
justum bonum est, et justa est Ills. vindicatio," 03
And punishment is good In a oertain way even for the punished person, because it helps him to reach his final s,pernatural goal.
Because of this goodness of punishment Augu:ltine does not hesitate
to attribute punishment positively to God: "Pecoatum ad Deum non
pertinet, poena peooati ad vindioem pertinet. n64
We have to ask now if the taot of physioal evil being punishment is another reason why physical evil is not an evil in the
strict sense.

In a certain way Augustine oertainly wants it to be

understood so.

Aa we have stressed so much before, Augustine views the single
events and tacts alwars from the point of vIe. ot the total order,
whioh represents Godts wisdom in this world.

Thus now, beoause

physioal evil is used by God as punishment, it contri.;,utes to the
goodness ot the universe in a special way.

It helps to oure the

sinful human beings so that the,. might fit into the universal order
and reach their tinal goal, and it is a kind of reparation for the

injury done to divine justioe.

However, there 1s a certain break between the oonsideration

or

phYSical evil aa neoessary oonsequenoe of a finite creation and

63~. Adimant., o. 26; ~. 42, 169.

64D1sp• !!!_

Fortunat.,

15; ~. 42, 118
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physical evil as punishment. While the first

ki~d

of consideration

is appllable to a pure natural order, the seoond kind presupposes
a supernatural order in whioh man is destined for eternal life in
union with God.

Augustine himself, however, does not know a clear

out distinction between a pure natural. order and the supernatural
~

ordel',

That's why in his writings these two points of view are

found aide by side.
e. Oonclusion
Lookina back at our whole consideration about physical evil,
we oome to the conolusion that for Augustine physioal evil can be
only an evil in a very improper senae.

We saw every being, in so

far aa it participates in being, to be goodJ for to be means to be
good.

Under this aspect there is no plaoe for evil: evil is

nothing.

That, however, does not mean that Augustine flatly denie

the roeal presence or physical evil in this world.

What he wants t

deny is only that evil in its metaphysioal essenoe is not a substantial principle, cont*ibutlng positively to the existenoe of
this world.
of nothing,

As it is a necessary consequence of the oreation out
80

in itself it is nothing else than a tendenoy ot the

oreature toward nothingness in oorruption and deoay.

As suoh

physioal evil 1s not a stain on God's oreation; muoh more, it unde
lines the beauty and the goodness of the universe. Finally physios
evil gets a new meaning and importanoe by being punishment,

80

being a means in God's hands for restoring the order of justioe
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~

medicine against the only real evil--sin.

CHAPTER III
MORAL l!.V!L

A. Introduotion: Physioal Order and Moral Order
Enoompassed by the Eternal Law

To turn fvom the physical order of evil to the moral order
does not mean in Augustinian ph1lo8oplq' to start from the very
beginning with an absolutely new subjeot.

There is no complete

oleavage between these two spheres.
Both orders, the physioal and the moral, are enoompassed by
the one eternal law.

This eternal law determiues the well ordered

events and the development of the inanimate and animate subhuman
natures.

It also orders men so that 1n freely living according

this eternal law they beoome just and united with God.

"Nos vera

...... secundum aeternam legem, qua natura11s erda servatu.r. juste
Vivimus. ttl This eternal law 1s identioal with God's essence" or
better: with God's wisdom and His will: "Lex aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei ord1nem naturalem oonserva.r1 iubens et perturbarl vetans."2
Beoause this eternal law 1s identioal with God's essenoe,

-

-

letr. Faustum, XXII. 27; PL.

2Ibid.; PL.

42,. 418
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42, 419
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Augustine can say that (rod 1s the last principle of all moral good.
Everything that 1s good 1s good only through Him in the same way as
everything that exists has its being only through Him.
Having this in mind; we will attempt to elaborate Augustine's
answer to the two questions: 1) What is the nature of moral evil?
and 2) What is the oriein and cause

~t

moral evilt

B. The Nature of Moral Evil
a.Negative answer
In the t,1'UIWer to the flUe stion about the ns. tuz-e of moz-al evil,
Augustine stresses the negative character of moral evil just as he
does 1n regard to physioal evil.
The Manioheans oontended that moral evil prooeeds from an evil

substance 1n man tending toward an evil objeot.

Against them Augus

tine defends the position that an evil action does not prove the
existenoe ot an evil substance either in the one do1ng wrong or
1n the objeot sought.

The oreatures to which man turns in his

immoral aotlon are good in themselves.)
oz-dinate attaohment to them.

What is wrong is his in-

Man was oalled by God to use the

creatures as means to z-each his final goal, God himself.

In acting

thus man beoomes the tree and dominating lord of all creatures.

J De Natura Boni, c. 34; PL. 42, 562: "Item quia paooatum vel
iniqultas non I's~petitio na~urartun mal.rum, sed desertio meliorumJ sic in Soripturis invenitur soriptum, Omnia oreatura Dei
bona est (1 Tim., IV, 4)."

In
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immoral actIon, however, man makes himself the slave of the lower
creatures by making them. the final end of all his wishes, seeking
in them all his happiness:
IlQuae quanquam in ordine suo recte locata sint, at surun
quamdam pulchritudlnem per8gent; perversi taman aaimi
est et inordinatl, eis sequendis subjicI, quibus ad
nutum ducpndis potius divino ordlne ao jure praelatus est. "4
.
Thus the object of sin is in itself good and therefore even in
immoral action man is striving for an image ot God.

It, however,

the object is good, it is neither necessary nor possible to conceive of the one acting immorally as an evil substance.
immoral act, in

30

Even an

tar as it has an accidental baing, is good.

Thus Augustine can say that in the act ot sinning man is trying to
imitate God, only he does it in a wrong way:
"Ita fornicatur anima, cum avertitul' abs te, at quaerit
extra 'be quae pura et liquida non inventt nisi Cllm
reddit ad te, Perverse te imitanturomnes qui longe
se a te t.eiunt, .t exto11unt se adver~ te. Sed
etiam sic~te im1tando indicant creatol'em te esse omnia
naturae. ";1
b. Positive answer
Sinee neither the object nor the subject nor the act or

tUl'~

toward the creatures as sueh makes an aet sinful. the only evil

~~ L1bel'o Arb1trio, I, 16, ~. 32, 1240.
5conf., II, c. 6; PL. 32, 681.
~Ctl'.

Seound. linieh., c.10, ~.42,

587.

59
in an

immo~al

$otion lies in the turning away from God, in the in-

ordinate use of' and the inordinate tending toward the crfiatures:
"Non est e~goJ ut dixi, peocatum mala. naturae appet1tio,
sed melioris desertio; et ideo factum ipsum maTuro est,
non ilIa nat~a qua male utltur peeeans, Malum est
enim male uti bono."b
Augustine describes this turning away from God as a falling away
from the highegt being and greatest good, and thus a
f~om

fallir~

away

the set order, which flows from and reflects the essence of

the highest being.

This falling away .from. God corresponds to What

Augustine describes in the subhuman creatures a.s the tending toward
nothingness,

the1~

decay, by which these creatures lose pa.rt of

that goodness which they should have.
pure deficiency.

Therefo~e immo~al

action 1s

It 1s something negative, even privative.

Primarily Augustine sees in moral evil this absence o.f the
right direction of our action.

But besides that, secondarily, htl

desoribes moral evil as a privation of goodness in the 8Gul of the
immorally aoting per30n.

As physioal siokness 1s not the substanoe

of the body, but the privatIon of the health and completeness of
the body, so moral evil, sin, 1s not·'.;the substanoe of the soul, but
the privation of goodness and the com.pleteness of tholoul.

In book III, chapter 65 and the

6De

to~lowing

of the Q! Lib< ro

Nattwa Boni, c. 36J PL. 42, 562.
C!'f. 15e trbir'O""'ArbItrI0,-r, 16, PL. 32, 12401 tt . . . . assentior,
omnIa pecciia lioc uno genera contlnerr, cum quIque avertitur a divln1s vereque manentibus, at ad mutabl1ia et Incerta convertltur. tt

J
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Aruitrio Augustine treats !!. proteaso the lessening ()f good in
soul aoting immorally.

Q

There he contends that the soul, though

losing of sonte goodness, is not z-obbed of 8.11 its goodness.
soul, though stained with sins, is on a tar
ness than th<t goodness in lower

l:l.atw~s.

hi~~er lev~l

This

of gOOd-

The ability to sin im-

plies that basic goodness that is inherent in the faculties ot
intelleot and will.

Man with these faoulties has greater metaphy-

sioal goodness even when he aots immorally than other creatures
have which do not possess intelleot and will,
lISiout enim m.elior est vel aber_"'ans equus, quam lapi s
propterea non aberrans, quia pz-oprio motu et sensu
oaz-et, ita est exoell~ntlor oreatuz-a quae libel'a voluntate peocat, quam quae propterea non peocat quia
non haberet llbaram voluntatem." (nr. 15)
Thez-afore God must be praised even in people aoting immorally. Thi
is not because the,. sin, but beeause they alwaY8 keep the

ot a Spil-i tual being,
God himself. 7

a.nd thi s 113 a higher form.

t~oodness

ot an image of

Aeaorditlg to Augustine the essential Goodness of

man which he possesses espeoially in his fz-ee will is never lost
by

aoting immorally.

man'
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The subhuman goods always remain far below

goodness.

7Ds Libera Arbittl0, III, 5, PL. 32, 1279: ffaur ergo non laudetur neue, 'et inellablIi praedieatione laudetur qui oum feoertt
ess quae in legibus assent justitiae permansarae, feoit etiam animas, quas vel peeoatuz-as vel in peooat1s etiam p ..:rseveItaturas esse
pItaev1debat: oum et tales adhuo mel10res sunt eis quae quoniam
nulllnn habent rationale ao liberum voluntatis arbitrlum paeeaIte
non possint?tt
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The tact that Augustine considers every existent as good and
determine. evil as the loss of good, could lead one to the conclusion that he thinks ot immoral aotion as corruption ot the substantial being ot the subjeot. 8 Yet he otten repeats that a high
nature, although corrupted, still remains better than a lower
nature, although not corrupt..

'rhus Augustine polnts out that the

dltterenoe between the good and bad angels lle. not in having a
4ifterent nature, but In the sin of the bad angels and the cleavi
to God of the good angels.

"The

creat~e,

therefore, Whioh oleave

to God, difters trom those who do not, not by their nature but by
their aoting which is immoral; and yet even in this very immoral
acting the nature itself is shown to be very noble and admirable.9
What Augustine means by the diminutlon ot being through Immoral action Is that man loses the partioipation 1n God.s being.
Aooording to Augustine man and angel were gifted with supernatural

8Trepta interprets Augustlne in that way_ He wr1tes (Pj 99.)
liegt hie:r der Gedanke vor, dass je mew das mora11sohe Ubel
die harmonische Selnsweiae 4er von Ihm beharteten Substanz aufhebt
es um so mehr auch die Realitit de:r letzteren verzehrt und damlt
zuglelcb •• ine e1geue Existens untergrabt. Denn, wie wlr sehan,
kann das Bose, als 8in Nlohtsubstantlelles, nu:r an elnem Realen 1n
die Wirklichkelt treten. So 1st das ganze St:reben des bose ge.o%'denen Realen gleichsam e1n selbatmorderlsohes, el st:rebt naoh
~.ln.r eigenen Vernlchtung.
Doeh lal8t August1n, um dle stet.
Uberlegenbe1t des von Gott gesehaftenan aealen uber das widergottI1oh. Blohts restzuhalt.n, das Bo •• aeln Z1.1 nle ganz e:rre1ohen,
sond.rn slch ihm hoohstens nihern (nihl1o appropinquare).M
nEs

9Q! Clvltate B!!, XXII, 1, ~. 41, 751-52
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11te trom the flrst moment of their existenoe, and with the power
of thls life they

we~e

the absolute belng.

direoted toward God, the hlghest truth and

It 1s preo1sely this standing betore God that

established the greatness of angel and man.

Related by spec1al

gift to God, they partake in His being and have 1n Him a higher
degree of being.

~ey

tural degree of being.
the

~

were llfted up above their created and naBut falling away from thehl6hest being,

essentla, angels and men are now on a level of belng

lower than they had been betore and lower than they should be.
Losing the intlmate conneotion with God that was theirs, the talla
angels and men kept only the1r finite nature.

Yet th1s nature w&.•

wholly or1ented toward the supernatural 11te.
Thus s1n not only d1sturbs the supernatural g1tts 1n man, but
it

cor~pt.

that natural perfeotion ot man which 1s constituted by

its corresponding measure, form and order.

Meaaure, torm and ora

reach 1n man the highest degree possible in thls visible world,
Decause in man they contain the ethical element ot the relation

ot the rational nature to God.
The measure of the soul consists ln wisdom.

By

this the soul

avoids the devlation into the 'too mucb t and ttoo little t
wisdom aa measure of the soul save. man

This

diving lnto the lusts

and fpc. separatlng himself trom all the world,
living egot1sttcally for himself. 10
~t

flesh

t~om

•

07 po.e~.

10Q! Libera Arbltrio, II, 9-16; PL. 32, 12$7 ss.

The natural form or beauty of the soul Is the

'~eotltudo

voluntatis' or the 'Yeritas t • Man has his oapacity for this actuated by grace. ll Now, after having turned away from God, man lost
this grace and with It the ability to direct his will easily towa
its only and highest good.

Through the aversion from God man
sinks into vanity and darkness of spirit. 12
3in thus corrupts the order within and without.

For

o~der

says: subordination of the body to the soul and of the soul to God
But through sin man puts created goods higher than God.

By per-

verting this most fundamental order, the order within man falls
apart.

The body no longer is obedient to the spirit but revolts

against it.

So the tendency toward nothingness which is the cha-

racteristic of sin exists In both the loss of grace and the disorder of natupe. 13
Concluding we must say that for Augustine the charaoteristic
trait ot moral evil - as we have seen it also for physical evilis the tendency toward nothingness.

He refuses to admit that.im-

moral action prosapposes an evil substance or that suoh immoral

11ctr.~. Manioh., c. 16-18; 1&- 42, 184 ss.
12»0 Gen. etr. Manich., II, 16; PL. 34, 208: "Partioeps veritatis pot.st esse-anIma humana, ipsa autem veritas Deus est immutabilis supra 111am. Ab ea ye~o verltate quiquls aversus est et
ad seipsum conversus tenebratur mendacio."
13De .Mor. Manieh. t c. 6; PL. 32. 1348: " ..... Nlhil est autero
esse, quam-uEum .ss••••• Quare-ordinatio 8SS8 cog1t, 1nordinat10
vero non esse."
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aotlon has itself any kind of sUDstautlal evil being.

Primarlly

immoral action is the wrong directedness of the will, its aversion
trom God and its Inordlnate conversion to the oreatures.

Seoon-

darily immoral aotion is the loss of goodness, loss of supernatura
lif. with its nearness to God.

This loss then effects the loss of

natural goodness of the human being.

o.

The Origin of Moral Evil

There arises the questlon now: whenoe oomes this talling away
from God?

~~ere

is the origin, what Is the cause at it?

First of

all it 18 apparent, Augustine answers, that God oannot be the OEms
of it, sinoe it is a movlng toward nothingness like oorruptlon in
the phy.ioal sphere.

God oannot at the same time be the cause for

be1ng and non.being.
Always having this viewpoint in mind. Augustine endeavers to
find an ana•• r which does not imply that ultimately God is the
cause ot sin 1n any wa1.

Because ot this, tne doctrine of the

Manicheans that the flesh 1s responsible for all moral evil is
unaoceptable.

In their dualistio conoeption there exist two huma

beings, the one born out ot voluptuous desires, godless and knowing only the sinful desires of the flesh, the other born out of th
spirit, similar to God and full of God's life.

For Augustine,

however, the total man with bod)' and soul has been created by God.
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Therefore man 1s good 1n his totality.14 We must love not only
our soul, but a130 our body, since God gave it to us that it might
help us with all its faculties to reaoh our final goal. "Sic uti ...
que dilig1t carnem suam, quam sibi ad obedientiam legitime subdit
atque ordinat. H15

h'verybcx1y who deolares the bod,. with

as the oause of sin, aoouses God and makes Him the last cause of
all moral evil. 16 The evils of the flesh, then, with its disorde
conoupiscence are due to original sin and are not originated by th
body as such.,

These evils are the result, not the cause of s:.n. 17

So we have seen that the negative answer on the question
about the origin o£ moral evil is very clearly given by Augustine:
neither God nor the flesh 1s the cause of moral evil.

There tore

the oause for all sin .. in so tar as there 1s a cause at a11140tr. Fauatum. XXIV, 2; PL. ~2, 475: "Non itaque unum homine
tecit a~magInem suam, at alte-ram tecit non ad imaginem auam: sed
quia hoo utrumque interlus .t exter1us simul unus homo est, huno
unum hominem ad imaginem sua. teclt ••• "

15~bid., XXI, 51 ~. 42, 391
l6De 01vltate Dei, XIV, 5J PL. 41, 408: "Non igitur opus est
in peccitls vItfI.qU;-nost~is ad-Creatoris injur1am oarnis aocusar
naturam, quae 1n genere atque ordIne suo bona est."
17Io1d., XIV, 3; PL. 41, 406: tfNam oorrupt10 oorporls quae
aggravata'iiimam, non peccatl priml est causa sed poena; nee oaro
eorruptlb1118 anlmam eeooatrioem, sed anlma peooatrlx fe01t esse
oorruptibl1em carnem. " •••• Vel'Ullltamen qui omnIa animae mala ex
corpore putant aooidls •• , in errore sunt."
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can be sought in tree will alone.

Thus Augustine somehow identi-

ties the questlon about moral evil with the question about tree
w1l1:
"Quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem oausae voluntatis malae? Aut enim et ip~a voluntas est, et a
padioe ipsa voluntatis non raoedit: aut non est voluntas, at peceatum nullum habet," Aut igitur voluntas
est prima causa peooandi, aut mal,xm pe~catum est causa
peoeandi: nee est, cui recte imputetur peocatum nisi
pecean,i. Non ergo est, cui recte imputetur nisi
volentl."18
b. Positive answer
Now we have to tind

o~t

how Augustine explains the taot that

the free will created by the good God turns away trom God toward
1.$8 goods.

How does tpee will get its movement toward nothing-

ness?
Augustine is abaolutely certain that we really have a free
wl11, that we choose in tree ohoice what to do and what not to do:
"Non eni. quldEluam tam firm. et Intlme aentio, quam
me habere voluntate. eaque me moverl ad aliquid fruendum, quld autem meum dicam prorsus non inv6nio,
ai voluntaa qua volo at nolo non est mea, quaprppter
oui tribuendum est, al quld per 111am male racio,
nisi m1h1?"19

18De
Libero Arb1t*10.
PL. 32, 1295.
-....
. III. 17, .......
19Ibid., III, 1, PL.32, 1272.
Thi't'iet that Augustine never doubted the full f~"'>eedom ot wil
even at the time when he had to stt-ess the importanoe or graoe in
the fight against the Pelagians, can be shown with his own worda
in the Retractationea and the De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio:
Retraotatlonea, I, o. 9, 3; PL:-32 , $95:-wQUapropter novi haeretio
PelagIan!, quI liberum sio asserunt voluntatia arbitrium, ut gratia. Dei non t-ellnquant lOGtm, quandoquldeM eam seoundum merita
nostra dar! asserunt, non se extollant, quaai eorum agerim causam,
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Influenoes from outside or from our own feeling and imagination do
not exclude .freedom of choiee.
on these influenees.

As bodl1y beings we are dependent

But freedom of ch6ice only says that we have

the power to rejeet or to accept objects whioh offer themselves to
our eyes or inner imagination. 20
Free will however as such does not
even the possibillty to sin.

in~lude

sinfulness or not

For if it did so, we would have to

say that God has no free wl11, while In reality God is the most
free being although He oannot sin.

This peou11arity Augustine

finds 1n the fact that the human free will has been oreated out of
nothing.

August1ne here compares the human 11'111 with all the ot

oreated beings.

As they corrupt because they are created

out of

quia in his librls d1x1 pro 11bero arbltrio, quae il11us dlsputat1on1s causa posoebat."
De Gratia at LIbera Arbitrio, 1; PL. 44, 881: "Propter eos qui
htmInls liberum arbitrlum s10 praiaicant at defendunt, ut Dei gratiam qua vooamur ad eum at a nostr1a malis meritis liberamur, et
per quam bona taeroltls comparamus quibu8 ad vitam parven1amus aeter
nam, negar. Budeant et oonentur auferre, multa lam disserulmus •••
Sed quoniam Bunt quldam, qui sic grat!am Del derendunt, ut negent
liberum arbltrium; aut quando gratia detenditur, negari existlment
liberum al'bltrlum, hlno aliqu!d soribere ••• curav!."
20De Libero Arbitrio, III, 25; PL. 32, 1307: "Quid autem quia
que velsumat vel respuat est in potestate, sed quo viso tangatur
nulla poteltas est: tatendum est at eX'superlor1bus at ex intel'loribus viais animum tang1 ut ratlonalis substantia ex utroque suma
quod vo1uel'itJ .t ex merito sumen41 vel miseria vel beatitudo aubs.quatur. n
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nothing, 30 it is this very oreation out of nothing that gives the
free will its direction ot aversion from the highest being toward
lower beings.
"Motus ergo i1le QVersionis, quod fatemll.r esse peccatum, quoniam defectivu9 motus est, omn1s autem defectus ex nihilo est, vide quo pertineret, et ad Deum
non pertinere ne dubltes."21 .
However, a certain neoessity seems to be implied in

Augustin~1

statement, as Evodius expresses this difficulty: "Quia s1 1ta est
data, ut naturalem habeat 1stum motum, jam necessitate ad haec convertlturJ neque ulla culpa deprehendi potest, ub1 natura necessita·
dominatur. rt22
Against this object10n Augustine answers that there is an
essential difference beside the similarity: While the stone necessarily falls and the finite body neoessar11y corrupts - the movement or the soul 1s willed and rree. 23
21~ Libero Arbitrio, II, 20; ~.

22Ibid., III, 1;

!&_ 32,

Thus the spirit 1s tree to

32, 1270.

1270.

23 Ibid., III, 1; PL. 32, 1271: "Qui motus 131 culpae deputatur
(unde qur-dubltat, 1rr!sione dignus tibi visus est), non est utique naturalis, sed voluntarlusJ in eoque simi11. est ill1 motui
quo deorsum versus lapis tertur, quod sicut iate proprius est lapi
dis sic 11le anim1: verumtamen in eo dlssimilis, quod in potestate
non habet lapis cohibere JIlotum quo tertur interius, animus v(~ro
dum non vult, non Ita movetur, ut superiorlbus desertis inferiora
deligatj at ideo lapidi naturalis est ille motus, animo vero ille
yoluntarlus."

sin or not to sin.

From the faot of being oreated results for

him only the ;eoss1bl1it:y: to sin.

For the irrational oreature, how-

ever, the necesaitz of decay end of all sorts of physioal evils
follow from the fact of being created out of nothing.
Vi.wing the whole realm of being,
this realm the

~osition

Au~ustine

locates within

of the free will which can sin.

This wIll

Is a g-ood in betw.en the highest and the lowest S?od: The subhuman
creatures cannot commit immoral acts, although created out of
nothing, because they have no rational nature,

God cannot commit

an immoral act,. although He is a rati9nal nature with frae will,
beoause He is the absolute -being, unable to fall a.way from Himself.
Only angel and man can camni t immoral aots, because they have a

rational nature and are created out of nothing.
Thus .e have seen that for Augustine being oreated out of
noth:ng and having free will are tho two presuppositions for the
possloility of moral
moral evil.

evil.~ But they do not give the oaUse of

In other words, the free will::itselt suoh as it has

been created Oy God, is not the CGuse of sin.

To understand this

answer. we have. to have a aloser look at what Augustine thinks
about the good will.
As in his theory of knowledge, so also here in his teaohing

24ne Libero Arbltrlo, II, 20; PL. 32, 1270: "Matus ergo i11e
aver.ionIs quod tatemur 85$8 peacatum, quoniam defectivus MotUS
est, omnis autem deteotu8 ex nihl10 est, vide quo pertlneret, et
ad Deus non pertinere ne dubites. Qui tamen defectus quonlam est
Yoluntarius, in nostra est positus poteatate."
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on freedom or will, Augustine stresses the total dependency of man
in his aotivity on the cooperation of God.
God gives him. the strength to do.

Man can only do what

"Da quod jubes at jUbe quod

vis.,,25
Thereroro the power of #ree

wil~;

aocording to Augustine,

cannot be ..H'feoti ve without the in:fluenee of God.

He has to give

divine concourse in so tar as the act of choice has existence,
which onl1 God can give.

God has to· give his gl'ace so that man

oan ohoose and do the good, beoause by ohoosing and doing some thins
goodman draws

n.a~el'

to God; he acquires new goodness.

And this

acquIring of .. higher degree of goodness and being oan only be don.
by the grace or God.
Accordingl1, for Augustine man oannot perform any good act
withoUt the divine help.26

Even the virtuous aots of the pagans

can only be done it God gives them His g1'80e.

However, this graoe

is different from the sanctifying grace of the ohildren of God,
by whioh they become able to perform meritorious aots for eternal

life.
Generally speaking one may say that without the qoncursus
sratlae man is too weak to tend towaras the highest being and therE-

250r. Contessionef!.' X. 29; .!!!. 32, 796: It • • • • lmperas nobis
continentiam. Ei oum soirem; ait quidam, quia nemo poteat esse con..
tinens nisl Deus det: et hoo Ipsum .rat saplentia. soire cujus
asset donum.(3ap., VIII, 21)"

26 De Libera Arb1trio, rI, 20; PL. 32, 1210: "Sed quonlam non
sicut homo sponte 0801d1t, ita etiamsponte surgere potest ••• !!
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fore in this case falls into disorder striving only for the goods
of this world.

This sounds, however, as if duing good comes only

from the power of graoe and that the will by itself oan only do
eVil.

That is, however not what Augustine teaches.

The good and

virtuous deed is not partly the effect of the will and partly the
effect of graoe, but it is at the same time totally the effect of
the grace and the w111.

God always offers enough grace to the w111

to turn toward the good.

And the w111 always remains free to ac-

cept the grace and to aot with it or to reject it.

When God en-

ables the will to will, and when He bestows on it the assistanoe
it needs to do what He orders, it is still the will which wills and
does what He orders,

The free will to do what God gave man the

power to do always remains untouohed.
Having in mind this complete dependence of the good free will
on grace and the unity of the good will with graoe, we can under.tand why Augustlne rejects the idea that this good free wl11 is
the cause of m.oral evll.

I.f this good fl'e8 wl11, such as it is,

act., the effect neoessarily must be good.
So w. have seen that for Augustine the good will is not the

cause of immoral aotion.

Therefore there rem.ains only the evil

will ss the cause of all evil:
" ••• radicem omnium malorum esse avarltlam (1 Tim.,
VI, 10), hoo eat, plus velle quam Bat est. Tantum
autem sat e.t,quantua sibi exigit naturae In suo
genera conaervand.e modus ••• Sed avaritla in omnibus rebus quae immoderate cupiuntur lntelllgenda
est, ubicumqueomnino plus vult qui.que quam sat est.
Haeo autem ayarltia oupidltaa est: oupiditas porro
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lmproba voluntas e!!lt.
omnium. causa est. "27

-

ErGO imEroba voluntas, malorum

Thus "evil will is the efficient cause of the evil action",28 and
the nature ot this evil will Augustine determines as avarice.

By

avarice, however, he does not only mean the immoderate desire tor
money.

Avarice is understood in a broader sense as cupidity, the

want tor more than 1s sufficient.

By this excessive wanting man

leaves the order into which he is placed.
It is in this sense that Augustine must be understood when in
another place he oalls 'pride' the beginning of all sins.

In pride

man looks at himself and his own greatness ln a disorderly way.
The real greatness ot man lies in the recognition and subordination
of himselt to God.

The proud man sees this subordination as an

unjustified limitation ot his own personality.
lute greatness, as it belongs only to God.

He wants an abso-

Wanting more than is

sufficient and proper to him. the proud man incurs disorder and is
thus directed toward nothingness.
Here arises a diffioulty: On the one hand Augustine declares
cup1dity in the widest sense as the cause ot all moral evil.

On

the other hand he rejects concuplscence as the cause of ev11, as
we have seen earlier.

There we saw that Augustine looks upon the

27De Libero Arb1trio, III, 17; PL. 32, 1294.
Cf. Risputa¥!o
Fortunat. -;-21; ~. 42, 123

m.

l8De Civitate Del, XII, 6; PL. 41, 353: " ••• mala voluntas
effloleni est operls mall. male iUtem yoluntatls .tfielens est
nlhll."
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disorderly desire of the flesh not as cause but as the effect of
sin, namely of the sin of Adam.

One is inclined to ask: is con-

cupiscence not one kind of oupidity, namely cupidity in the sphere
of the flesh?

For Augustine it is not, and therefore the contra-

diction between the two statel"1ents is only an apparent one.

When

speaking of conoupiscenoe, Augustine understands by it the fleshly desires which are present and active without or even against
will.

0

Therefore, sinoe the cause of immoral action can be only in

the will, ooncupiscenoe is not the cause of immoral action.

When,

however, speaking of cupidity, Augustine understands by it an aotivity of the will, as can

seen in the quotation above: "cupi-

be

ditas porro improba voluntas est."
by

an irrational longing.

oause ot sin.

The will may have been tempted

But this irrational longing is not the

The cause is in the disorderly acting will itself.

We have seen now, what Augustine determines as the cause of
all immoral actions: the evil will, 'voluntas improba'.

But with

a oertain necessity a i'urther question Is raised ['or us: what
causes the will to become evil, what makes him turn away ['rom. God,?
To this question Augustine answers: ttl do not know.

For that whie

is nothing oannot be known. "29
To understand what Augustine means in saying that sin is a
'matus dereotlvus' whiah has only a 'oausa dettaiens', it is useful to look at a text in the

-

~e

-

Civitate Dei, in whiah he more

29De Libero Arbitrio, II, 20; ~. 32, 1269.

14
otten uses this expression.

There he wrItes:

If the further questIon be asked, what i8 tha eftloient
cause ot evIl, none is found. It is the will itself
which makes the aotion evIl, but .~at Is it that makes
the will evil? And thus evIl wIll Is the efficIent cause
of the evIl action, but of the evIl will there Is no
3uoh cause ••• Let no one, therefore, look for the etflclent cause of the evil will; for It Is not efficient
but deticient: thIs wIll is not" productive of an effect
but it is a detect. DefectIon from that whioh supremely Is, to that which is in a less4egree, this is the
beginning ot an evil wIll. But to .eek to discover
the cause of these defectlons--causes as I have said,
not efficIent, but .eficient,--is tantamgunt to endeavoring to see darkness or hear silenoe."JO
In order to understand oorreotly Augustinets dootrine, we have to
distinguish between the formal and material aspeot of moral avil,
as we have done it in regard to physical evil.
The formal aspect gives the essential nature of evIl, shows
moral evIl as pure negativity, as the absence of the .ell directed
activity ot the will towards God.

This absence in reality is a

detective movement, Is a falling away trom God, the highest being,
towards the lower beings.

In this taIling away, Augustine says,

the wIll 18 not effioient, but defioient, it i8 lackIng a reality
that should be there.

Sinoe this privation as 8uch Is not a real

something, It cannot be known; tor it has no corresponding divine
idea.

This, however, does not mean that evil does not exist.

Pri-

vat1on, although not a real existent, deSignates something, a state
of affairs that 1s verJ real.

30De 01vltate

B!!,

This realIty Is the materIal aspect

XII, 6 ss.; ~. 41, 353

SSt
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ot ev11. In physioal evil it was the

cor~pted

oreature.

he~e

It

1s the evl1 corrupted wl11 which ls stl11 powertul enough to oommit crlmea and all klnde ot Immoral actlons. 31
Augustlne does not at all denJ the posltlve po.er whlch evl1
bas In its Gonox-ete to:rm.

Thus' oausa

detl01en~'

must not be unde:-

stood as the absenoe of any power. It does not say that the wl11
il inaotlve In s1n. 32 Thax-etore Augustlne calls the ev11 wl11 the
'./fl01ent'
cauae ot the evl1 actlon.
,

The wl11, In so tar as It

oommits a s1n, performs a spontaneoua aotl "Spontaneus est autem
lste detectus, quonlam 81 voluntas In amore superlorls Immutabl11s
boni atabll1s permaneret, non Inde ad sibl placendum. averteratur. ")

Thus sln, evl1 wll1, In Its concrete torm Is not pure passlvlty.
nor non-aotivit"

but a spontane6us mov ••ent.

Besldes.

ma~

81no-

IlJDls, whloh AugustIne uses for 'detloere' such aa -,e.ereret,'aver-

tet re f, t rell99,wu:" t, • oontemnere t, all have the .eanlng of an ao31K.Sclpl0 do•• not se. this mater1al aspeot of ev11, al It
ls found In Augustine's teadhlng about the 'oausa defl01ena'.
Scipio wrlte. on p. 1071 "Ole Auat1uoht, dass lUi a.s US.t und das
so •• kelne a.usa .ttlo1ena su tlnden sel, aondern nu~ elne cau ••
aetielen., 1st ~ooK nu» .In bl11Iges Wort.plel, VOl' weloham slo~
er fiehk.r in den wlchtlgaten Erorterunaen huten 9011te. So .ehl'
Augustin praktlsoh das Bo.e nw.st und sloh del" furohtbar verderDlichen Maoht dess.loen bewusst 1st, so lat doch selne Lebre vom
Ubel und BOlen - intolge selner antlk-asthatlsohen Nelgungen- eben
zu s.br blo ••• Theorl. In des Wortea etymologlsch-wlssenschattllener Bedeutung. und as tehlt darln zu sehl' das 8ewusst.eln von
del' Macht und Bedeutung dessen. was Kant-allerdings von del' anderen
Selt. her su extrem - 'das radlka1e Bose t senannt hat."
3 20t• ~ Llbera Arbltrl0, II, 20, PL. 32, 1270.
33~ C1vltate ~, XIV, 13J ~. 41,

420.
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tlve movement of the wl11.

They thus conflrm the conviction that

Augustine means a real aotive movement by his concept of 'oausa
deficlens'.

So one may say that teffioere t and 'defioere t are not

different in regard to intensity and reality of the will's movemen1
but they are difterent in regard to

t~eir

dlreotion seen against

the background of the universal order.
For a deeper understanding of the ooncept 'causa deticiens.,
we have to think of what we said earlier about the intimate connection between the free acting of man and the cooperation of God
that exists in the Augustinian way of thlnking, Man as he has been
created by God is wholly directed toward God and is called to the
most intimate oommunion with God.

For this communion with God he

is equipped with a divine vital power, which he uses in his love
of God.

These acts of love man accomplishes himself as they have

been given to him by God.

Thus his aoting is efficient.

This is

the task man has to perform, to lay hold on himself and to fulfill
himself by and with his free acts.
In sin, however, man turns .way from God. From the highest
good he

t~ns

to the finite goods.

This aversion is a defeotus.

But it is a defect not only in regard to the Object.

Man falls

away trom himsel.f by not aooomplishing any more the high power of
grace, the love of God.
his power only.

In a certain way man acts with halt of

His activity 1s only 'delioiens', insufficient.

In the same degree as man does not achieve himself and his own per-
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tectlon, he also falls away from God and Hls divine order

(~

ae'erna), thus committing sin.
Ooneluding we must say that the origin of moral evil lles ln
the oreated free will.

Turning a'lla'1 from God, ho.ever" the will

is not effioient, but deficient, lacking goodness, not achieving
that goodness God gave it the power to achieve.

Since thus the

evil will ls deprived of goodness, lt does not need an efficient
cause.

For the absenc,e of goodness needs no cause.

mean that in sin the will ls not active.

This does not

It means that the slnner

is rejecting the grace. God offers him for doing the good, thus
falling away fram the intimate unlty with God.
Did Augustine succ.ed .ith his teaching about the causa

~

fleiens in making it impossible to declare ultimately God responsible for moral evil?
glve man freewill?

Doe. not the question arise: Why dld God
Is not the donor of this dangerous glft him-

self ultimately responsible for our morally bad deeds?3~

To this

dlfficulty Augustine ans.ers that the '11111, although not an absolu'e good as the vl~es, nevertheless 18 a gOOd 35 which 'lias dest

34D8 Libera Arbitrio, I, 16, PL. 32, 1240: "Sed quaero utrum
ipsum l!ie~ arbItrlum quo paceanat facultatem habere convincimur
oportuerit nobis dari ab eo qui nos fecit. Videmur en1m non fuiss
peccaturi, si iato careremus; et metuendum est ne hoc MUndO Deus
etiam maletactorum nostro~ auotor existimetur."
35 Ib1d ., II. 19. !!!. 32, 1269: "Ita fit ut neque i11a bona
quae a peccantibus appetuntur, ullo modo mala sint, neque ipsa voluntas libera, quam in bonis quibusdam medi1a numerandam ease
comper1mus."
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to be used
sponsible

fo~
fo~

the accomplishment of

mo~al

the misuse of this gift.

good.

God 1s not re-

As the eye is not evil be-

oause 1t oan be m1sused, sO neither tne w1l1 1s ev1l because 1t oa~
turn away from God. 36 The misuse does not abollsh the goodness of
the glft.

God

o~eated

man 'tthat.

"het.he~

they wll1ed to sin or not

to sin, they might be the ornaments of h1s un1ve~se".37

The h1gh

position God gave to man, demanded that Be equipped him wlth this
preoious g1ft.

Because God gave to man all the help and

needed to stay 1n union with God and

90

g~aoes

he

to achleve his own perfec-

tion, Augustine oonolude.1
"Omnino 19itur non in...8nio. neo inven1~1 posse. et
prorsus non esse cont1rmo, Quamod Q tr1buantur pecoata nostra oreatori nostro Deo. lt.} a

-

36 01'. De L1bero A~bItrlo, II, 18, PL. 32, 1267.

37 De LIbera ArbItrI0,

III, 11, PL. 32, 1287.
Verw,yen wrItes 1n hls 'book D1e Ph1losoPh1, ~ 111'elalter" (BerlIn u. LeIpz1g, 1921 ), on page 37: "Eln Werturtel1
also: d1e F~elhe1t de~ Wahl z.isohen Gut und Bosem ist, trot a ihres
mogllohen Mls.orauohe. und d.~ daduroh besrundeten e.igen Hollenst~ate, .ertvoller als di. naturnotwendlge R10htung auf das Gute,
bl1det den i~rationalen Einsohlag in dle rationalen Bemuhungen um
eine Theo~ie des Bo.en. n Verweyen's misinterpretation at Augustlne'!
point at vl •• as lrrational is founded on Verw.yents negligenoe of
Augustine's theooentrio way at thinking.

17M.

-

38De Libero Arbitrio, III, 16; PL. 32, 1293.

-

CONCLUSION
Let us look back now at this whole study with the question:
does St. Augustine in his anti-Maniahean works otfer a solution ot
the probl •• ot evil, that takes away

~rom

evil its

t~eaten1ng

and

frightening oharaoter.
W. have seen how Augustine arrives at the tirst stage ot his
solution by applioation of metaphysical principles whioh he had
learned trom Plotinus.

These prinoiples enabled Augustine to see

the essenoe ot evil as non-being, as a privation ot beIng and goodness.

This Augustine will always keep as the essence of evil.

The

Characteristic of this tirst stage, bowever, is that evil is seen
aa a

~.ceasary

consequence ot tln1te material beings.

Even in

their oGPruptlon these 'material things contribute to the beauty and
perteotion ot the universal order of which they are a part.

Thus

the natural order ot the whole justifles the corruptlon of the part
ao that the oorruptlon cannot be called aa evil in the striotest
sense.
This solution, oorreot within its own limits, is incomplete
and theretore not satlstrios to man who lives in a world whioh has
been polluted.

By the

s~dy

of Holy Scripture Augustine becomes

more and more aware that the only real evil is sin.

Sin is evil

in the strictest sense, because here a oreature decays, turns away
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trom the source ot all goodness. Sin is not a necessary consequencE
of manta being oreated, thus contributing to the beauty ot a universal order; rather, by tree choice it destroys the unity between
nature and God.
Throuah sin the whole original o!der is so destroyed that the
soul is no longer obedient to God, nor the body to the soul, and
the whole of subhuman nature becomes opposed to man.

In this gene-

ral disorder physical evil is not merely the consequence of creation out of nothing, .but it gets a ne. meaning: it is punishment
tor sin.

As punishment, physical evil has in a stricter sense the

character of eVil, because it is treely contracted by the sinner.
rlut since punishment is a means to restore the universal order of
justice, it is not an ev11 1n an absolute senS8 like s1n.
Augustine's whole endeavor 1s to show that the cause of any
~1nd

of ev11 oannot be found 1n God.

Physical evil as suoh is the

necessary consequence of finite natures within a temporal hierarohical order.

As a falling away from being, physics.l evil has no

oause at all.

Moral evil on the contrary cannot be explained by

a h1erarchical order, to the beauty of which it would contribute.
Like pbJsical eVil, it ia a fal11ng aWBY trom being.
it is similaI' to

p~sical

evil.

In so tar,

But as a breaking out ot the ori-

ginal order, moral ev1l needs an independent and free causality
and can be understood only on suoh terms.

However, il the source

tor sin would be an etfioient cause, then ultimately God would be
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responsible for 1t, since the will can be efficient only by using
God's help.

Yet, as a falling away from being, moral ev11 has no

efficient cauae.
cause

d~cides

The cause is deficient.

The will as deficient

not to use the divine po •• r, with the help of which

it could accomp11sh its own

perf.ctIo~.

pletely ours, to which nothing fopces us.

But this decision is com-

We aaw that Augustine,

stressing the negat1ve character ot evil, does not neglect the
other aspect ot evil, namely evil as a powerful force in this worl
Thus Augustine prove. a God, who is not responsible for the
evil 1n this world.

God, the .;;;.;;;;..;;;;.;;=SUmmwm Esse, created only the good,

and as tar as there is evil in H1s creation, 1t is deoay trom bei
which God permits for the benefit of a higher good.

Nothing hap"

pens, that the almighty Goodness of God does not make subservient
to a good.
The solution of these books then 1s 1n pointing to the almighty goodness of God.
may draw

h~a

From the conviction of Godts goodness man

consolation; no one needs to despair, since God is

goodness itself and the good is the only powerful principle, is
being.

But Augustine was too much a religIous thinker to be convince
that he had completely solved the problem of evil, the problem
which he calls a difficI1lima quaestio.

The problem of evil lead

him to the mystery of the relation between free will and grace, to
the mystery of predestination and ultimately to the mystery of
Holy Trinity_

His searohing mind always sought to penetrate deepe
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into these mysteries, but at the same time he was willing to bend
his head before the infinite majesty of God, and to adore Him in
His sanctity.

To know that God is the highest Good was enough for

him to overcome the despair and anxiety of the human heart in the
face of all the evils of this world.
The ultimate solution given to the problem of evil is the
divine love, whieh was presented

to~us

in Jesus Christ. To this

Augustine points especially in his later books, but oan be found
already in his anti-Maniahean works:
"Sedquoniam non sicut homo sponte aeoidit, ita .tiam
sponte potest surgere, porrectam nobis desuper dexteram De!, !d est Dominum nostrum Jesum Ohristum fide
firma teneamus, et e%pectemus carta spe et earitate
aPdent! desld.ramus."l.

-

In. Libe~o Arbltrl0, II, 20; PL. 32, 1270

-

APPENDIX
FREE WILL AND GOD':3 FJRMNUVVLEDGE

TI'aolng the oI'igin of moral evil. back into the human free wil
Augustine necessaI'ily had to explain the relation between fre8 will
and God's foreknowledge.
For many a thinker of olden and modeI'n times freedom of will
and foreknowledge aI'e incompatible with one another. l Especially

Cloero's solution of this problem,

in the De Civitate Dei Augustine explains in the discussion with

-

only an apparent one.

that this incompatibility is

Augustine PI'OV8S that instead of destroying

the treedom ot wl11, God·. toreknowledge makes free will possible.
For, as

W8

have seen above, everything whioh exists has its exis-

tence only because it partakes in the being of God and beoause it
corresponds to a divine idea.

How then could the knowledge of God

lLe Roy Burton, P. 121p "We are inevitably forced to ask,
what is tZ'eedom? In what does a tree aet oonsist? It by a tree
act .e mean the reduction of a dual or multIple fUture possibIlity
to a single aotual result, then 1t seems impossible for even omniscienoe to know our future choices. ~~solence cannot perform th
impossible nor oan omniscienoe know the unknowable. It our tree
ohoioes are foreknown acoording to Augustine's thought, and it thi
position rests upon anything more than a desire to avoid religious
soruples, then we find an inadaquate oonoeption of freedom."
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be an obstacle ror the existence ot tree will, 9ince 1t 1s the
foundat1on for it:
"Ita tit ut at Deum non negemus esse praese1um omn1um
tuturorum, et nos tamen velimus quod volumus. Cum
enim sit praescius voluntatis nostrae, cu1us est praesclus ipsa erit. Voluntas ergo erit, quia voluntatis est praesoius. Nee voluntas esse poterlt, a1
potestate non er1t. Ergo et potestat1s est praescius. Non ergo per 8ius praesc1entis.m mihl potestas
adim1tur, quae propter•• mihi certior .derit, quia
ille Guius praescientl~non fallitur, adfuturum
mihi esse praesolvit."2
That means that the tree will as such is included in the intramundane causes, as they are known 1n God's omniscience.

Then Augus-

tine shows In the example, that it there would be human foreknowledge with regard to tree acts, it would not cause the tree act.3
How.ver, auch an example does not explain how there can be real
foreknowledge, it we have a tree will.
More satistying is the hint that the incompatibility which
we see between free will and foreknowledge is conditioned by our
anthropomorphioal oonoeption of God's knowledge.
to conoeive God's knowledge as being in time.
is no past, no present and no future in God.

We are aceustomec

But in reality

ther~

Theretore, Augustine

s81s, we must oompare God's foreknowledge with our human memory.
As our memory of past events does not produoe or influenoe these

past events, so God's foreknowledge sees future events, without

20e Libera Arbitrio, III, 3; PL. 32, 1275.
...........

3~., III,

r

4;

PL. 32, 1276.

___
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influencing them, beoause He .ees them as happeaed, as faots.4
Without doubt these thoughts are not a oomplete explanation
about the 'how' of the relation between freewill and God's foreknowledge,

This' how' will be an ete.r>nal riddle tor man.

But

August1ne at least suooeeds in pointing out that there is no contradiotion between these two, whose existenoe we know with absolute
oertainty.

The inner st:ruoture ot'the relation, however, remains

a JD.1stery.
4De Libero Arbltrl0, III, 4. PL. 32, 1276: "Siout enlm tu
memoriatua non cogls facta esse qUae praeterlerunt; sic Deus prae ...
solentia sua non ooglt raclenda quae tutura sunt. Et siout tu
quaedam quae racistl memlnistl, nae taman quae meministi omn1a tecisti, ita Deus omnia quorum ipse auotor eat praesoit, neo taman
omnium quae praescit, ipse auctor est."
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